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Abstract 
The Impact of Conservatism, Internal Control Reliability, 
and Experience on the Use of Analytical Review 
May, 1987 
Jeffrey R. Cohen 
B.A., Bar Ilan University 
M.B.A., Columbia University 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Thomas Kida 
When conducting an audit, auditors could rely on tests 
of details and/or analytical review procedures as substantive 
tests. Preliminary research suggests that auditors may be 
utilizing analytical review results to extend testing but not 
to reduce it. The objective of this study is to evaluate the 
impact of this conservatism effect, along with the influences 
of internal control reliability, and experience on the use of 
analytical review. To test for these effects an audit of the 
sales and collection cycle is experimentally manipulated. 
Subjects are asked to determine the extent they would modify 
a sample audit plan, given analytical review results and a 
description of the internal control system. The primary 
dependent variable is the total hours allocated in the audit. 
To test for conservatism, analytical review results are 
manipulated to either signal problems or not to signal 
problems in certain account balances. In addition, the 
reliability of the internal control system was manipulated as 
either strong or weak, and the experience of the subjects was 
considered. Fifty seniors and forty-six managers from eight 
national accounting firms participated in the study. 
The results indicate that analytical review results and 
the reliability of the internal control system do have 
significant effects on modifications rendered to planned 
audit work. A conservatism tendency is evident among 
auditors in their use of analytical review results when 
compared to a base audit plan. Auditors are utilizing 
analytical review to extend testing when it signals problems, 
but they are reluctant to reduce testing when analytical 
review results signal account balances are in order. 
While the main effect for experience was not 
significant, an examination of the individual cells suggests 
that seniors and managers differ in their modifications to 
the audit plan. These differences cancelled out in the 
aggregate because of the conflicting interactions between 
analytical review results and internal control reliability. 
For seniors only, similar modifications were made in all 
cells except where analytical review signalled no problems 
and internal control was strong. Conversely, investigating 
only managers, similar changes were rendered in all cells 
except where analytical review results signalled problems and 
internal control was weak. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One major goal of the auditing process is to evaluate 
and verify the reasonableness of financial statement items. 
•V, 
This is achieved by examining and testing a firm's internal 
control system and by conducting substantive tests of account 
balances. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1 (1972) 
states that substantive tests can be performed with two 
general classes of auditing procedures: (a) tests of details 
of transactions and balances, and (b) analytical review 
procedures applied to financial information. 
Tests of details are procedures which attempt to 
corroborate the reported account balance by tracing the flow 
of accounting transactions and verifying the accuracy of 
financial records from sources both inside and outside the 
firm, e.g., confirmations of receivables, physical 
observation of inventory, a review of cancelled checks, etc. 
Therefore, the objective of the tests of details, to 
reconstruct the aggregated balance, is achieved by a 
bottom-up approach. 
Analytical review is a technique in which auditors 
evaluate the reasonableness of reported unaudited book 
balances by comparing the balances with an expected value 
based on a judgmental or quantitative based analysis. In 
contrast to tests of details. 
1 
2 
analytical review is a top-down approach in which, according 
to Strirvger and Stewart (1985, p. 5), "the reliability of 
individual recorded transactions and balances is inferred 
from evidence of the reasonableness of the aggregate 
balance." 
SAS 23 (1978) highlights three stages of an audit where 
analytical review can be utilized: 
1. The initial planning stages as a "red flag" attention 
directing device, 
2. As a substantive test of an account balance, and 
3. At the end of the audit to examine if the financial 
statements as a whole makes sense. 
When performing the analytical review, SAS 23 states that 
auditors can use the results to identify areas where either 
additional testing needs to be done or where the extent of 
detailed testing may be reduced. 
In recent years, fundamental changes in the accounting 
profession have occurred which enhance the attractiveness 
of using analytical review as a substantive test. Albrecht 
(1977), Bernstein (1978), Gordon and Dohan (1983), and 
Lightner, Leisenring and Winters (1983), have pointed out how 
increased competition for audit fees has put pressure on 
accounting firms to control audit costs. Holder and Collmer 
(1980) argue that the use of analytical review procedures 
could provide better and cheaper audit evidence than detailed 
tests of transactions and balances. Since tests of details 
3 
involve inspecting the documentation and tracing the flow of 
individual transactions, it is costly to implement. 
Consequently, relying heavily upon tests of details will put 
a firm at a disadvantage in an environment of cost control. 
If analytical review is utilized as a substantive test in 
revealing account balance errors, it could result in the 
reduction of the extent, if not the nature, of other more 
costly and time consuming substantive tests. 
Another recent change in the auditing environment is the 
ever increasing computerization of most clients' accounting 
functions. Biggs (1982), Loebbecke, Mullarkey and Zuben 
(1983), and Daroca and Holder (1985) argue that this change 
has generated less visible audit trails, which in turn, has 
decreased the effectiveness of commonly used tests of 
details. In contrast, a premium is placed on tests, such as 
analytical review, that are less sensitive to the method in 
which accounting transactions are processed. 
Despite these changes, the degree to which auditors 
rely upon analytical review procedures as a substantive test 
is unclear. Blocher, Esposito and Willingham (1983, p. 81), 
in an experimental study of analytical review based 
judgments, conclude "that the auditors in the aggregate 
perceived analytical review and tests of details to be 
substitutes and the mix does not appear to affect their 
perceptions of the strength of audit evidence." 
4 
In contrast, Wallace (1983b) contends that there are 
misconceptions concerning analytical review which impedes a 
wider application of the technique. Although Wallace did 
not conduct a survey of auditors, she posits that auditors 
perceive that analytical review provides only soft evidence 
since it's considering aggregated data and is a very 
subjective technique to implement. Moreover, Wallace asserts 
that auditors would be reluctant to implement analytical 
review procedures unless the data had first been validated as 
accurate through tests of details. 
Purpose of the Study 
Hylas and Ashton (1982), in a review of financial 
statement adjustments found that analytical review procedures 
were more effective than traditional substantive tests (e.g. 
test of details) in revealing account balance errors, across 
a variety of accounts. Consequently, the benefits of using 
analytical review to its fullest potential could be both 
increased efficiency (through a decrease in the nature and 
extent of testing) ajid substantial effectiveness. The 
purpose of this study will be to examine variables that 
affect the use and reliance upon analytical review 
procedures. Three specific topics are investigated: 
1. The potential of a conservatism tendency to extend but not 
reduce testing. 
2. The effect of the strength of the internal control system, 
5 
and 
3. The impact of an auditor’s experience on the use of 
analytical review. 
SAS 23 states that auditors can use the results of 
analytical review to both extend and reduce the nature and 
extent of audit work. However, there has been some limited 
support that auditors are not utilizing analytical review to 
its fullest potential. 
In an extensive examination of decision making with 
analytical review, Biggs, Mock and Watkins (1985) utilized 
protocol analysis to investigate various facets of analytical 
review judgments. One of their findings provides initial 
data suggesting that analytical review procedures are used to 
extend testing but not to reduce it. If auditors are 
primarily using analytical review to extend testing, the 
implication is that analytical review will be conducive to 
i ncreasing, and not decreasing, the cost and extent of the 
audit work. However, the extensive data gathering 
requirements of the protocol analysis methodology allowed 
Biggs et a 1. to evaluate the decisions of only four auditors. 
In effect, while protocol analysis enabled Biggs et a 1 . to 
analyze the decisions of the four auditors in detail, the 
generalizability of the results based on so few subjects is 
limited. 
Payne, Braunstein and Carroll (1978) indicate that 
6 
protocol analysis is especially suitable for exploratory 
studies. Protocol analysis allows in-depth analysis of 
complex decisions suggesting hypotheses which can also be 
tested by other research methods. Payne et al. argue that a 
(p. 38) "valuable approach to studying decision behavior is 
to employ more than one form of data collection and 
analysis." Consequently, a major objective of this present 
study is to investigate whether this propensity to extend but 
not reduce testing based on analytical review results, can be 
generalized to a larger population of auditors. 
The human information processing (HIP) literature is 
replete with studies demonstrating heuristics and simplifying 
strategies decision makers employ when searching and using 
information for decision making purposes (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Snyder and Swann, 1978; Bar-Hillel, 1980; 
Cohen, 1981). However, the results from auditing contexts 
have not always reflected findings from the psychological 
studies. A propensity towards conservatism may explain why 
some of these results have not been found when tested in 
auditing contexts. For example, Joyce and Biddle (1981a) 
detected in a test of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, 
that when subjects were presented with a description of 
internal controls that changed from strong to weak, 
they overadjusted when determining the extent of testing. 
Tomassini, Solomon, Romney and Krogstad (1982) examined the 
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calibration of auditors' judgments. They found that 
auditors, unlike other judges, tend to be overcautious and 
underconfident in their assessment of prior probability 
distributions. Kida (1984) analyzed the impact of a firm's 
going concern status. Interestingly, the auditors were 
inclined to pay more attention to failure items than success 
items. This result occurred even for those auditors who were 
presented with an initial hypothesis that suggested success. 
Libby (1985) revealed another type of conservatism at work 
when he had audit managers generate hypotheses for possible 
causes of errors in an analytical review task. Subjects 
cited errors which overstated net income and liquidity to a 
greater extent than errors which understated net income and 
liquidity. Hence, the main objective of this study is to 
determine if a conservatism bias exists which will predispose 
auditors to use analytical review to extend planned tests of 
details but not to reduce planned tests of details. 
Another variable which may affect the use of analytical 
review is the strength and reliability of the internal 
control system. The second standard of audit field work 
(1972), calls for the study and evaluation of a firm's 
internal control system when determining the extent of audit 
testing. Moreover, SAS 23 (1978) states that when auditors 
are planning and performing analytical review procedures, 
they should consider the reliability of the financial and 
8 
non-financial information. 
Whether auditors are sensitive to the reliability of the 
data is an empirical issue. While Joyce and Biddle (1981b) 
and Bamber (1983) found in within-subjects designs that 
auditors are sensitive to changes in the reliability of 
information, Joyce and Biddle found that they did not attend 
to reliability in a between-subjects design. 
Therefore, the issue concerning auditors ability to 
differentiate reliability of source information in a 
between-subjects design, which is more like the actual 
decision task, is questionable. Consequently, another 
objective of this study will be to examine the degree to 
which analytical review judgments are influenced by the 
reliability of the internal control system. It is expected 
that when auditors are performing analytical review 
judgments, they will attend to the reliability of source 
information. This should arise because, as Cushing and 
Loebbeck (1983) point out, for analytical review procedures 
to be effective, the numbers used in the analysis must be 
free from any manipulation. Under a strong internal control 
system, this assumption would most likely be met. 
Experience may also affect analytical review judgments. 
Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka, (1978), in a study concerning 
expert versus novice decision making of physicians, found 
that experts are more likely than novices to construct an 
9 
overall picture and causal schemas when solving complex 
problems'. However, the literature investigating the impact 
of experience on audit judgments has been varied. While 
experience has had little influence on the relatively 
straight forward internal control evaluations (e.g., Ashton, 
1974; Ashton and Brown, 1980; Hamilton and Wright, 1982), 
it's been demonstrated that there is a positive association 
between experience and quality of judgments in the 
materiality area (e.g., Messier, 1983; Ettenson, Krogstad 
and Shanteau, 1981; and Krogstad, Ettenson and Shanteau, 
1984). 
Since the use of analytical review involves both an 
understanding of the complex interrelationships between 
account balances and an understanding of the link between the 
analytical review results and the extent of audit testing, 
it's expected that experience will influence the way one 
performs and uses analytical review. In fact, Biggs et al. 
(1985) found that managers and seniors acquired and evaluated 
information for analytical review in a different fashion. 
Although all four auditors were inclined to be conservative 
and use the results of analytical review to generally 
increase the extent of the audit work, the managers were 
likely to extend only the tests which directly related to the 
problem account (i.e. the collectibility of the receivables). 
In contrast, the seniors used the error in receivables to 
10 
increase testing throughout the sales and collection cycle. 
Accordingly, another purpose of this study will be to 
investigate the role of experience in analytical review 
judgments. It is expected that managers will be more 
efficient than seniors in utilizing analytical review 
procedures to modify testing only in areas where a problem 
exists. 
The rationale for testing the impact of conservatism, 
internal control reliability, and experience in the same 
model is that the literature indicates that there should be 
significant interaction effects. For example, in this study, 
the differences between seniors and managers should be 
accentuated further because this study requires subjects to 
synthesize their evaluation of the reliability of the 
internal control system and the analytical review results 
with a determination of the nature and extent of the audit 
work. The findings from studies of expert decision making in 
other disciplines (e.g., Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka, 1978; 
Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981; Charness, 1981) suggest that 
managers will be more effective than the less experienced 
seniors in performing this task because of their ability to 
identify and integrate complex i nter-re1 ationships. 
Similarly, Biggs and Mock (1983) found, in a protocol 
analysis study of audit scope decisions, that inexperienced 
auditors executed decisions in an ad-hoc serial fashion, 
11 
while more experienced auditors carried out the task by 
constucting an overall picture of the firm. 
The reliability of the internal control system should 
interact significantly with the results of analytical review 
procedures. Holder and Collmer (1980) posit, that when there 
are adequate controls and the analytical review results 
confirm an auditor's prior expectations about account 
balances, then the auditors can limit other substantive 
tests. If the client has inadequate controls, and the 
analytical review procedures confirm the auditor's prior 
expectations, they argue that auditors should not limit the 
other substantive tests. However, Holder and Collmer contend 
that if there are inadequate controls and the analytical 
review procedures point to unusual fluctuations in the 
account balances, auditors should use these results to expand 
other substantive testing. 
Moreover, the interaction of the internal control 
reliability and conservatism is suggested by the Biggs et al. 
(1985) study. One reason why auditors in that study might 
have been conservative in their use of analytical review 
results is because of possible weaknesses in the internal 
control system. For example, one weakness involved the lack 
of separation of duties between the posting of the cash 
receipts and sales to their respective journals and the 
posting of the transaction to the detailed accounts 
12 
receivables card. The literature on internal control 
evaluation has been overwhelming in citing the separation of 
duties variable as being the most important cue when 
evaluating the reliability of an internal control system. 
Therefore, auditors may not have used analytical review 
results to reduce audit work because they considered internal 
control to be weak. Whether similar decisions are made under 
strong internal control systems must be tested. Hence, one 
objective of this study will be to investigate the degree to 
which the conservatism tendency and the reliability of the 
information will interact with experience in influencing 
auditors' utilization and reliance upon analytical review 
results. 
Overview 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Chapter II discusses the literature related to analytical 
review and highlights the need to study in greater detail the 
evaluative and judgmental processes of analytical review. 
Chapter III describes the task, task setting, the hypotheses 
to be tested, and the statistical methodology utilized to 
analyze the results. Chapter IV presents the statistical 
analysis of the study. Chapter V discusses the results of 
the study and the implications it has for the accounting 
profession and accounting research. 
CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
The literature studying analytical review has taken 
three general approaches: 
1. Testing the relative merits of various quantitative 
techniques to analytical review. 
2. Surveying auditors regarding their use of analytical 
review and analytical review procedures. 
3. Studying in a descriptive and experimental manner 
judgmental approaches to analytical review. 
Consequently, the literature review will correspond to 
the preceding taxonomy. 
Quantitative Techniques to Analytical Review 
Since analytical review involves the formation of 
expectations about predicted account balances, it's only 
natural that most of the analytical review research has 
concentrated on testing which statistical technique would be 
most accurate in predicting account balances. Kinney (1979) 
demonstrated how even limited information approaches (e.g., 
the expected value of an account balance proportion in the 
audit period is the account balance proportion in the 
previous period) did reasonably well in predicting when an 
unaudited account balance did or did not need a material 
adjustment. Therefore, the rationale behind this literature 
13 
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is that by using formal structured models (and even naive 
approaches similar to Kinney, 1979) we will improve the 
effectiveness of analytical review judgments. 
The use of regression analysis in analytical review by 
the "Big Eight" accounting firm, Deloitte, Haskins and Sells 
(DHS) was discussed by Stringer (1975). He explained how DHS 
used a stepwise regression approach utilizing 36 months of 
data to generate the model. Stringer and Stewart (1985, p. 
25) in their discussion of the DHS approach, state "the extra 
effectiveness of statistical techniques provides a reasonable 
basis to support an increase in the relative reliance that is 
appropriate for analytical review and a resulting decrease in 
the extent of tests of details necessary in a given 
situation." 
One reason auditors might be reluctant to rely upon 
analytical review could be their perception that reliance 
upon analytical review results will cause increased 
vulnerability in the event of a litigation suit. However, 
Wallace (1981) reviewed the law literature and found 
legal support for the use of regression analysis in auditing 
judgment. By using regression analysis in analytical review, 
she argues that auditors will have a more quantitative and 
objective basis for defense if they are brought to court. 
Given that regression analysis is used in analytical 
review by at least one "Big Eight" firm, and that regression 
15 
analysis has legal support for use as evidence, one question 
addressed in the literature is to determine how effective is 
regression analysis as a substantive test. 
Kinney (1978) tested how a regression approach would 
compare with a sophisticated time series model, 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA), and with 
naive models based on last year's data in predicting account 
balances for operating revenue for a sample of 6 railroads. 
Using the mean absolute error as the criterion, he found that 
regression did about as well as the more complex ARIMA models 
(.0468 for regression, .0556 for ARIMA, and .0401 for ARIMA 
with a transfer function), and that both regression and ARIMA 
did much better than the naive martingale and submartingale 
models (.0778 for martingale and .0728 for the 
submartingale). 
In addition, models based on 36 months of data (similar 
to the DHS approach) performed better than models based on 
120 months of data. Apparently, the dangers of structural 
changes in the underlying relationships during a 120 month 
period outweighed the disadvantages of using only 36 months 
of data. 
Kinney and Salomon (1982) tested the ability of three 
alternative regression approaches, including the DHS 
approach, to detect material accounting errors (arbitrarily 
defined as 2% of the expected audited balance of the 
16 
account). Using a simulated time series on hypothetical 
firms, Kinney and Salomon found that the DHS approach based 
on a monthly materiality criterion yielded fewer Type I 
errors (the model indicates an investigation when no 
accounting error is present) and therefore was more 
efficient than the approach predicted on an annual 
materiality criterion. All three approaches generated Type 
II errors (the model indicates no investigation when an 
accounting error is present) at a rate less than the stated 
risk level. 
Many other studies have examined the issue of using 
regression in analytical review. Kaplan (1979) did a case 
study of a large industrial firm and tried to build 
regression models from 36 months of data to predict account 
balances for both income statement and balance sheet accounts. 
He found that the models worked best for annual income 
statement accounts and performed poorly for balance sheet 
accounts. 
Akresh and Wallace (1980) and Neter (1980) also used the 
case study approach to examine the effectiveness of 
analytical review. Akresh and Wallace assessed the use of 
regression to predict seven account balances for a public 
utility firm using both auditor specified and stepwise 
regression models. They found that both auditor specified 
2 
and stepwise models did quite well (with adjusted R s 
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ranging from .944 to .998 for models using 36 observations) 
and that using 36 as opposed to 84 observations yielded 
better predictions of account balances. 
Neter used a case study of a large firm with many sales 
outlets to examine two issues. First, he compared how an 
auditor specified and a stepwise regression model would 
perform in predicting the accounts receivable balances for 
two divisions. Next, he investigated how multiple regression 
models would compare to auditors' judgments in identifying 
unusual performances of sales outlets. The results were 
similar to Akresh and Wallace. Both the auditor specified 
and the stepwise regression approaches were quite good in 
2 
predicting the account balance (R s ranging from .869 to 
.940). However, the tendency towards conservatism on the 
part of auditors led to differences between the regression 
model and the auditors' judgments in identifying the unusual 
performances of sales outlets. The auditors tended to 
identify outlets with higher than expected sales or lower 
than expected cost of sales while the more objective 
regression approach put equal emphasis on whether the outlets 
were either higher or lower than expected for both accounts. 
Imhoff (1981) and Lev (1980) employed a cross-sectional 
approach to testing regression approaches to analytical 
review. Imhoff studied 94 large industrial firms to 
determine which variables can best predict income statement 
18 
elements. The results indicated that only gross margin was 
consistent across firms in predicting sales and that sales 
was the best predictor of the other income items. Lev was 
interested in comparing the use of single index models (gross 
national product, or total corporate profit after taxes) 
versus double index models (which also included an industry 
factor) in predicting sales, operating income and net income. 
He used over 500 firms from COMPUSTAT to formulate his 
regression models and found that the single index models did 
better than a naive submartingale model. Interestingly, the 
2 
inclusion of the industry factor increased the R s for the 
double index models. Hence, when auditors are doing 
analytical review procedures they should pay attention to 
industry data. One problem though in using industry data is 
that it is difficult to identify industries in which 
companies are clearly in the same line of business. 
Taken as a group, the studies examining regression 
indicate that the use of regression as an analytical review 
procedure holds much promise. It has greater explanatory and 
predictive abilities than naive limited information 
techniques. Interestingly, it appears that a regression 
model based on approximately 36 months of observations 
(similar to DHS approach) often outperforms models from 
longer periods. 
Surprisingly, regression holds its own against more 
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complex statistical techniques. Similar to the findings of 
the already cited study by Kinney (1978), Albrecht and 
McKeown (1977) demonstrated that regression was as effective 
as ARIMA in predicting operating revenues, operating expenses 
and payroll expense for three companies. Dugan et al. (1985) 
explain that a shortcoming of ARIMA is that it fails to 
pinpoint the relative contribution of the trend cycle, 
seasonal, and irregular components to changes that occur in 
the time series. Arrington, Hillison and Icerman (1983, p. 
178) argue that, "ARIMA, in its multivariate form, is 
theoretically the most effective procedure since it subsumes 
both limited trend and regression analysis. However, due to 
extensive data requirements, the complex notational 
appearance, difficulty with the ability to interpret, and the 
direct and indirect costs of operationalizing, the ARIMA 
modelling process may be limited in terms of current 
applications." Table 2.1 summarizes the results of the 
studies investigating the effectiveness of the quantitative 
analytical review procedures. 
Although none of the cited studies examined how and if 
auditors actually used these quantitative analytical review 
procedures, the findings would tend to imply that regression 
analysis would be a more valuable input to an Auditor's 
decision process than would ARIMA. This is because the 
regression approach is more easily understood and less costly 
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to develop than ARIMA. Wallace (1983b) argues that use of 
the more objective quantitative techniques to form 
expectations about account balances, as opposed to a more 
judgmental approach, could lead to a more effective audit. 
One issue that needs to be examined, is to determine how 
auditors' judgments will be influenced by the use of 
quantitative analytical review procedures. 
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TABLE 2.1 
.Summary of Quantitative Studies of Analytical 
Review Procedures 
Study Albrecht and McKeown 
(1977) 
Ki nney 
(1978) 
Quantitative 
Techniques 
Analyzed 
Regression 
ARIMA 
a. Univariate 
Box-J en kins 
b. Bivariate 
Box-Jenkins 
Regress i on 
ARIMA 
Naive models 
a. Martingale 
b. Submartingale 
Sample Used Three firms, Monthly 
Data. 
a. 30 months 
6 rail road firms. 
Monthly data 
a. 36 months 
b. 120 months 
January 1959— 
December 1973. 
Account 
Balances 
I nvestigated 
and Criterion 
Measured 
Operating Expense, 
Revenue, and Payroll 
Expense. 
a. Predict account 
balance 
Criterion Variable, 
a. Residual Standard 
E rror. 
Operating Revenue, 
a. Predict monthly 
balances. 
Criterion Variables, 
a. Mean Square 
E r r o r. 
c. Mean Absolute 
E r r o r . 
Results Regression and ARIMA 
are e ffective 
techniques. Mixed 
results as to which 
approach is better. 
1 
Regression and 
ARIMA were better 
models than naive 
approaches. 
Regression and 
ARIMA performed 
approximately the 
same. Models using 
36 months of data 
were s uperior. 
22 
Study Kaplan (1979) Kinney (1979) 
Q u a n t i t a't i v e 
Techniques 
Ana 1yzed 
---- 
Regression 
_ 
Only naive models. 
a. Normal earnings. 
b. Last year's 
earnings. 
c. Proportion of 
accounts to total 
financial 
statement of 
which it is a 
part. 
d. Ratio of accounts 
allowing 
consideration of 
different 
financial 
statements. 
e. Last year 
adjustment 
signals an 
adjustment this 
year. 
Sample Used One large industrial 
f i r m. 
Monthly data 
a. 36 months January 
1974-December 1976. 
44 manufacturing 
firms with sales 
between five and ten 
million dollars. 3 
years of annual data 
Account Various Balance Sheet Various Balance Sheet 
B a 1 a n ce s and Income Statement and Income Statement 
Investigated Accounts. Accounts. 
and Criterion a. Predict month!y, a. Predict material 
Measured quarterly and 
annual balances. 
Criterion Variable 
a. R 2 
adjustments. 
Criterion Variable 
a. Type I errors - 
i nvestigate when 
no adjustment 
needed. 
b. Type II errors - 
don't investigate 
when an adjustment 
is needed. 
Results Regression worked 
best for annual 
balances of income 
statement accounts. 
1 
Naive models do a 
good job in 
predicting an 
adjustment. Last year 
adjustment rule has 
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Kaplan (1979) 
continued 
Kinney (1979) 
continued 
- 
least number of Type 
I errors but most 
number of Type II 
errors. 
Study Akresh and Wallace 
(1980) 
Lev (1980) 
Quantitative 
Techniques 
Analyzed 
Regression 
a. Auditor specified. 
b. Stepwise. 
Regression 
a. Single index 
models. 
b. Double index 
models. 
Samp 1e Used One 1arge public 
utility firm. 
Monthly data 
a. 36 months. 
b. 84 months. 
COMPUSTAT firms 
Sales - 573, Operating 
I ncome - 531, Net 
Income - 587. Annual 
data. 
a. 19 years, 7 
periods. 1949— 
1967, 1950-1968, 
1951-1969, 1952- 
1970, 1953-1971, 
1954-1972, 1955- 
1 973. 
Accounts 
Balances 
Investigated 
and Criterion 
Measured 
Electric Revenue, Gas 
Revenue, Electric 
Production Expense, 
Gas Production 
Expense, Depreciation, 
Allowance for Borrowed i 
Funds and interest. 
Predict annual account 
balance. 
Criterion Variables 
2 
a. R 
b. Precision - one- 
half the monthly 
materiality cutoff. 
Sales, Operating 
I ncome and Net 
Income. 
a. Predict annual 
account balances. 
Criterion Variable 
a. R 2 
Results Auditor-specified and 
stepwise models had 
high predictability. 
Assumptions of 
Regression were not 
seriously violated. 
Single i ndex models 
worked well. Adding 
an industry factor 
improved the model's 
predictive ability. 
Study Neter (1980) 
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Imhoff (1981) 
Quantitative Regression Regression 
Techniques a. Auditor specified 
Analyzed b. Stepwise 
Sample Used One large firm. 94 COMPUSTAT 
Monthly data. industrial firms. 
a. 48 months, January Annual data. 
1973-December 1976. a. 11 years. 
Account 1. Accounts Receivable Income Statement 
Balances Predict account Accounts. 
I nvestigated balances for two a. Predict annual 
and Criterion divisions. account balances. 
Measured Criterion Variables Criterion Variable 
2 2 
a. R 
b. Mean Relative Error 
2. Seven Income 
Statement accounts 
for various sales 
outlets. Identify 
out 1ets with 
unusual 
a. R 
performance. 
Results Auditor-specified and Sales is an 
stepwise models had excellent predictor 
high predicabi1ity. of other income 
Conservatism tendency 
in auditors when 
identifying sales 
outlets with unusual 
performances. 
statement accounts. 
Study Kinney and Salamon 
(1982) 
Quantitative Regression 
Techniques a. Use of month 1y 
Analyzed materiality cutoffs 
to signal 
investigation 
(similar to DHS) 
b. Use of annual 
materiality cutoffs 
to signal 
i nvestigation. 
c. Annual materiality 
cutoff in 
Samp 1e Used 
Kinney and Salamon 
( 1 982 ) continued._ 
conj unction with a 
monthly fi1 ter rule 
for large 
deviations. 
Simulated Time Series. 
48 Observations per 
years, 200 simulated 
audit years 
Account 
B a 1 an ce s 
Investigated 
and Criterion 
Me as u red 
Time Series Accounts. 
Determine when to 
investigate an account 
balance. 
Criterion Variables 
a. Type I errors - 
investigate when no 
adjustment is needed. 
b. Type II errors - 
don't investigate 
when an adjustment 
is needed. 
Results | All approaches yield 
; Type II errors less 
i than stated risk level, 
j The monthly materiality 
cutoff rule was the most 
efficient. 
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Surveys of Auditors 
Another body of literature investigating analytical 
review utilizes surveys to ascertain the nature and extent 
that auditors in the field actually use analytical review 
procedures. 
The surveys have uncovered an overwhelming tendency for 
auditors to use judgment based analytical review procedures. 
Biggs and Wild (1984), in a survey of 127 "Big Eight" 
accountants, found that over 90% of them use a judgment based 
procedure to analytical review such as scanning the data and 
ratio analysis. Daroca and Wilder (1985) canvassed members 
of the Private Companies Practice Session of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) regarding 
the usage and applicability of various analytical review 
procedures. The most important procedures in order of usage 
for an audit were: 
1. Comparison of current with prior year's financial 
statement figures, 
2. Working capital, 
3. Gross margin on sales, 
4. Comparison of relationship of individual items with 
totals for each year, 
5. Current ratio, and 
6. Profit margin on sales. 
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The complex statistical procedures were less frequently 
used. Only 5.3% of the auditors stated they used regression 
analysis more than "rarely", while only 3.4% responded even 
"rarely" in their use of Box-Jenkins. Even those who did use 
a statistical technique generally did not place great 
importance on the procedures. Hence, in practice auditors 
tend to rely on analytical review procedures which require 
little, if any, statistical sophistication. The high degree 
of agreement among those surveyed by Daroca and Wilder (1985) 
and by Biggs and Wild (1984) implies that it is highly 
improbable that there would be a firm effect when studying 
analytical review judgments. 
Tabor and Willis (1985) interviewed seven audit 
managers, from one office of a "Big Eight" firm, on their use 
of analytical review in actual audits (two clients per 
subject). The general consensus of the auditors was that 
there had been increased usage of analytical review 
procedures as a means of substantive testing in recent years. 
Most of the usage tended to be non-quantitative (e.g., 
scanning the data) or simple quantitative procedures (e.g., 
ratio analysis). However, in the future, five out of the 
seven auditors predicted increased use of regression 
analysis as an analytical review procedure. Although Tabor 
and Willis did not explicitly test how the reliability of the 
internal control system would impact on the use of analytical 
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review procedures, they found that for three out of the five 
audits where analytical review procedures were extensively 
used (which they defined as the use of analytical review 
procedures for over 80% of the audit planning time), a strong 
internal control system was present. The audit managers 
surveyed stated they could rely more upon analytical review 
procedures because of the client's strong internal control 
environment and that the clients had a long-standing 
relationship with the auditing firm. 
It appears logical that if the numbers investigated with 
analytical review are produced by a system which is 
relatively free from bias, then an auditor could place 
greater reliance on analytical review as a substantive test. 
This would be congruent with Bamber's (1983) study which 
demonstrated that audit managers are sensitive to changes in 
the reliability of source information when determining the 
extent of audit testing. Furthermore, Cushing and Loebbecke 
(1983) argue that although material errors can occur under a 
good internal control system or a bad one, the analytical 
review procedure will be most effective in revealing errors 
which came within a firm possessing a good internal control 
system. They cite the example of using trend analysis in 
order to identify unusual fluctuations. For this analytical 
review procedure to be effective, one must assume that the 
base period data is correct and that this year's data can't 
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be manipulated to ensure a uniform trend. These assumptions 
would most likely be confirmed under a strong internal 
control system. 
In addition, the second standard of audit field work 
states (1972), "There is to be a proper study and evaluation 
of the existing internal control as a basis for reliance 
thereon and for the the determination of the resultant 
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be 
restricted." Hence, one objective of this study is to test 
in a controlled setting, whether, and to what extent, 
auditors' use of analytical review procedures is affected by 
the strength of a client's internal control system (the 
assumption being that the stated controls are corroborated by 
compliance testing as being effective). 
Another issue addressed by the surveys is to determine 
which auditing procedures are most effective in detecting 
errors in financial statement account balances. In a survey 
of auditors by Biggs and Wild (1984), it was found that over 
40% of financial statement errors detected by auditors were 
initially detected by an analytical review procedure (median 
45%, mean 41.5%, and a standard deviation of 25.9%). 
Although not a survey, another study which investigated the 
issue of the relative effectiveness of various auditing 
procedures was conducted by Hylas and Ashton (1982). They 
examined 281 errors requiring financial statement adjustments 
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on 152 audits conducted by Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell (PMM). 
Hylas and Ashton discovered that a greater number of errors 
occur in smaller companies, and that for these companies, 
errors tend to be greatest in the revenue cycle. 
Interestingly, analytical review procedures detected more 
errors than any other technique. Conversely, tests of 
details were found to be least effective in uncovering 
financial statement errors. An explanation for their finding 
is that the greatest causes of errors were attributable to 
client personnel and insufficient accounting knowledge while 
the causes of errors which lend themselves to extensive 
testing of details (e.g., mechanical errors, inadequate 
controls, etc.) were fewest in number. From the above 
results, one could infer that firms should spend less time on 
costly tests of details and put more emphasis and reliance on 
analytical review procedures. Table 2.2 summarizes the 
results of the surveys of the use of analytical review by 
auditors. 
31 
Table 2.2 
Summary of Surveys of Auditors on 
Use of Analytical Review Procedures 
Study 
  
Biggs & Wild (1984) Daroca & Wilder (1985) 
Subjects 127 "Big Eight" 269 C.P.A.'s, members 
Accountants. Mean of the Private Practice 
audit experience 
4.5 years. 
Section of A.I.C.P.A. 
Main Variable 1. Percentage of Analytical review 
of Interest respondents using procedures applicable 
various analytical and u sed for both an 
review procedure. audit and a review 
2. Perceived Value of 
Analytical Review 
Procedures 
(allocate 100 
points). 
3. Perceived Value of 
Procedure as 
Affected by Prior 
Use. 
4. Percentage of Errors 
initially detected 
by Analytical Review. 
engagement. 
Results 1.a. 95.9% - scanning. 1. Little and 
b. 89.4% - ratio insignificant 
analysis. difference 
c. 11.4% - regression. between use of 
d. 8.1% - time analytical rev i ew 
series. procedures in an 
2. Mean Data audit or a review 
a. 39.90- scanning. engagement. 
b. 35.76 - ratio 2. Most important 
analysis. procedures were 
c. 4.78- regression. judgment or simple 
d. 4.60 - time quantitative 
series. methods (e.g., 
e. 15.00- other. comparing current 
3.a. Significant year's financial 
relationship statement figures. 
between prior use working capital, 
and perceived e t c. ) 
value. 3. Very little use of 
b. Relationship regression analysis 
especially strong and Box-Jenkins 
Biggs & Wild (1984) 
_continued_ 
for quantitative 
procedures. 
4.a. Median 45.0%. 
b. Mean 41.5%. 
c. Standard Deviation 
25.9%. 
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Daroca & Wilder 
(1985) continued 
approaches. 
Study Tabor and Willis 
(1985) 
Subjects Seven audit managers 
of one "Big Eight" 
firm. 
Main Variables 
of I nterest 
1. Current role of 
analytical review 
p roced u re s. 
2. Has the use of 
analytical review 
procedu res 
changed over time. 
3. What is the future 
for analytical 
review procedures. 
Results 1. Analytica 1 review 
procedures which 
are used tend to 
be non-quantitative 
or simple 
quantitative 
techniques. 
2. Significant 
increase in use of 
analytical review 
procedures (P < .005) 
in simple 
quantitative 
techniques. 
3. a. All of the 
respondents 
indicated increased 
use of analytical 
review. 
b. Five of the Seven 
auditors predict 
i ncreased u se of 
regression analysis. 
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Studies of Judgment in Analytical Review 
The literature investigating judgments using analytical 
review procedures has taken two directions. One approach has 
used descriptive case studies in which no variables are 
experimentally manipulated (e.g., Holder, 1983; and Biggs, 
Mock and Watkins, 1985). The other approaches taken an 
experimental design thrust, looking at the use of heuristics 
and the impact of situational variables (e.g., Blocher, 
Esposito and Willingham, 1983; Kinney and Uecker, 1982; 
Biggs and Wilder, 1985; and Libby, 1985). 
Holder gave subjects (35 senior auditors with at least 
six months of supervisory audit experience) a description of 
a small wholesale consumer-products firm including the 
strengths and weaknesses of a client's internal control 
system, two years comparative financial statement data, and 
general economic and industry conditions. Based on the above 
information, subjects were to devise and execute a program of 
analytical review procedures and to identify audit risk 
areas. The main objective of the study was to determine how 
auditors use analytical review in the planning stages of an 
audit. 
He found the most extensively used analytical review 
procedures were: 
1. Inventory turnover, 
2. Gross margin ratio, and 
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3. Accounts receivable aging analysis. 
Trend analysis items (e.g., trend of accounts receivable 
level) were also frequently used but no use was mentioned for 
regression or time series data. The latter finding is 
probably an artifact of the study, since it might have 
required too much effort for subjects to derive this data on 
their own. Future studies investigating the significance of 
using different analytical review procedures on auditor's 
judgments should make available quantitative data as input to 
the decision process if an auditor requests it. The 
analytical review procedures found to be most important by 
Holder (1983) and by Daroca and Holder (1985) were presented 
to subjects in this study. It should also be noted that 
Holder found no significant differences between the 
analytical review procedures used by auditors from small 
firms and those used by auditors from large firms. This 
would suggest that there is little need to worry about a firm 
effect when studying judgments utilizing analytical review 
procedu res. 
A more ambitious case study was undertaken by Biggs et. 
al. (1985). Subjects were given a comprehensive case study, 
developed from an actual audit of an electronics firm carried 
out by a medium size auditing firm, in which the unaudited 
balance of accounts receivable needed to be adjsuted. Biggs 
et al. only used four subjects (two seniors and two managers) 
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because the process tracing technique of concurrent verbal 
protocols was employed to analyze how and why subjects made a 
decision. Subjects verbalized the steps they were taking at 
the same time as they were performing the task. The strength 
of protocol analysis is that by sifting through a subject's 
verbally expressed decision process, one can determine what 
information was acquired, how the information was evaluated, 
and how an action or a choice by a subject was implemented. 
However, since protocol analysis requires a voluminous 
quantity of data, only a few subjects can be studied, which 
limits the study's generalizability. 
In the Biggs et al. study, subjects were provided with 
over 100 pages of background material, including four years 
of audited data, the current year of unaudited financial 
statement data, and background material on the economy, 
industry, and the company itself. The four subjects were 
asked to prepare and implement a program of analytical review 
procedures and evaluate the planned substantive audit 
program. All of the subjects were successful in utilizing 
analytical review to pinpoint an adjustment problem in 
accounts receivable. The criterion for accuracy was based on 
the actual adjustment to accounts receivable made by the 
auditing firm. Although the real world decision could have 
been incorrect, Biggs et al. argue that it had passed a 
"market" test. 
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In the analysis of the subjects' evaluations of the 
planned audit program, it was evident that they were using 
analytical review to extend the nature of the planned tests 
and not to reduce them. Although SAS 23 stated that 
analytical review procedures can be used to both extend and 
reduce audit testing, it appears that analytical review is 
not being used to its fullest potential. 
Another important finding of the study was that managers 
and seniors acquired and evaluated information differently. 
Managers placed greater emphasis on industry and economy wide 
data than did seniors. In addition, seniors tended to use 
analytical review to increase tests for all areas of the 
revenue cycle while managers tended to be more selective in 
their increase in testing. 
Biggs et al. argue that seniors tend to concentrate only 
on the surface features of a problem while managers were able 
to identify the subtle and complex relationships between 
analytical review evidence and audit program changes. They 
suggest that this ability is caused by the impact experience 
has on the internal causal schemas that experts bring to a 
task. 
The role of experience has been extensively studied in 
the auditing judgment literature. Ashton (1983), in a 
review of research in audit decision making, concluded that 
the role of experience is inconclusive. In the widely 
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researched area of internal control evaluations he posits 
(p.22), "that quality of internal control evaluation has not 
been demonstrated to be a function of auditing experience." 
On the other hand, for materiality judgments, Ashton 
concluded that there was a positive relationship between 
experience and consensus. The differences between the 
findings he attributes to the nature of the task. The 
internal control judgment is a well-defined, continuously 
repeated task while the materiality judgment is ill-defined. 
Another explanation for the finding could be that the 
internal control judgment requires an evaluation of a 
discrete part of the audit work while the materiality 
judgment requires an understanding of the inter-relationships 
between different parts of the audit work. 
The task of analytical review based judgments is more 
congruent with the materiality judgments than the internal 
control judgments. Anlaytical review requires not only 
forming an expectation of a single account balance but an 
expectation of how different accounts should interact with 
each other. Hence, one would expect that the more 
experienced managers would utilize analytical reivew in a 
more effective and efficient manner. Investigating the role 
of experience in using analytical review is one of the issues 
tested in this study. 
Another approach used to study judgments based on 
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analytical review has been to investigate the impact of 
heuristics. The literature encompassing this approach has 
its roots in the seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
who describe "rules of thumbs" people utilize to cope with 
complex probabilistic decisions. Libby (1981) discusses the 
three heuristics: 
1. Availability - the probability that an event or 
outcome will be recalled is affected by the event's 
perceived frequency of occurence. 
2. Anchoring and adjustment - decision makers evaluate 
information against an initial value which then 
gets adjusted, and 
3. Representativeness - decision makers will estimate 
the probability that an event or person comes from 
a certain population by the perceived degree of 
similarity of the event or person with members of 
that population. 
Blocher et al. (1983) experimentally examined the impact 
of anchoring and adjustment, as well as the structuredness of 
one phase of the decision process on subjects' usage of 
analytical review procedures in a judgment involving payroll 
expense. Forty-four auditors from one firm took part, of 
whom 32 were audit supervisors and 12 were seniors (each of 
whom had at least two years of audit supervisory experience). 
In the study, anchoring and adjustment was manipulated 
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by describing the scope of work executed in the prior year's 
audit (high/low). The structuredness of the decision process 
was manipulated by the use of a checklist for suggested 
analytical review procedures (provided a check1ist/did not 
provide a checklist). Although the results of the study 
indicated high variability of judgments concerning the use of 
analytical review procedures in relation to tests of details, 
the effect of the independent variables was not significant. 
For example, providing a checklist of analytical review 
procedures tended to influence subjects to allocate more time 
for analytical review but it also caused more lengthy audit 
programs. Blocher et al . suggest that this result is 
probably an artifact of the research design, since subjects 
might have perceived that being provided a checklist was a 
signal for a "red flag" in the audit. 
Two surprising findings of their study were: 
1. In the aggregate, subjects treated analytical review 
procedures and tests of details as substitute tests, 
and 
2. The typical revisions of last year's scope of audit 
work resulted in a reduction of audit testing. 
The finding that subjects treated analytical review 
procedures and tests of details as substitute tests, was 
derived by conducting correlational analysis. For example, 
the correlation coefficient for budgeted analytical review 
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hours and budgeted tests of details hours was negative and 
significant (r = .490, p = .001). Moreover, the correlation 
between the ratio of budgeted analytical review hours and 
budgeted tests of details with subjects' ratings of the 
quality of audit evidence approached zero and was 
insignificant (r = .09, p = .789). This implies that not 
only did the auditors use the two classes of tests as 
substitutes, but they also perceived the quality of audit 
evidence to be comparable in strength. 
It would appear that the results concerning the revisions 
of the scope of audit work contradict the earlier cited work 
by Biggs et a 1. (1985) which had concluded that auditors use 
analytical review to extend but not to reduce planned testing 
of details. The conflicting results could be caused because 
the Blocher et al. paper only examined the audit program for 
one account (payroll expense). In contrast, Biggs et al. 
looked at entire cycles of an audit (sales and collection 
cycle, and inventory cycle) in which one account did need an 
adjustment (accounts receivable). 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic was also 
examined by Kinney and Uecker (1982) and Biggs and Wild 
(1985). Both studies had subjects establish confidence 
intervals for investigating unaudited gross profit %'s. The 
rationale for conducting the studies is that in theory 
auditors should not be influenced by the unaudited book 
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values when forming expectations about the true book value. 
Otherwise, they would be increasing the likelihood of 
commiting a Type II error, not investigating when the unaudited 
account balance is really in error. 
In the earlier study, Kinney and Uecker manipulated the 
anchor by giving subjects (154 audit seniors) either high or 
low unaudited book values. Although auditors in the low book 
value condition set a significantly lower investigation 
boundary than subjects in the high book value condition (P < 
.01), the results were less pronounced in the upper 
investigation boundary (P < .09). Because of the 
experimental design, the effect of the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic is ambiguous. Subjects in the low book 
value condition had a gross profit % declining each year 
while in the high book value condition, the unaudited gross 
profit % was a reversal of the previous year's trend. The 
subjects, when setting a non-investigation region, could 
have been responding to a trend in the data rather than just 
being affected by whether the book value was high or low. 
To counter this problem, Biggs and Wild added a control 
group who did not receive the unaudited book value. Their 
subjects, 121 auditors from four "Big Eight" accounting firms 
with a wide range of experience, were asked to estimate the 
expected audited value and to establish 95% confidence 
intervals for upper and lower limits of the gross profit %. 
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Using the control group as the base rate, they still detected 
a judgmental bias in the direction of the unaudited book 
values. 
However, the bias was attenuated when subjects were 
provided with a longer information set of five years of 
audited data as opposed to the two years of data presented in 
the Kinney and Uecker experiment. One implication of these 
results is that by providing auditors with more complete 
information sets, their judgments using analytical review 
procedures might be improved. Although, Kinney (1980) 
argued for the need for research investigating the 
effectiveness of different approaches to analytical review, 
it is still open to question what will be the impact of 
different types and sources of information will have on 
analytical review based judgments. 
Libby (1985) examined the degree to which the 
availability heuristic would affect the generation of 
hypotheses for possible causes of errors in a preliminary 
planning stage use of analytical review. Thirty-seven audit 
managers of one "Big Eight" firm were provided with 
background information about a client and three financial 
ratios (gross margin, current ratio, and quick ratio) for the 
prior year's audited statements and for the current year's 
unaudited account balances. The current year's ratios were 
manipulated to contain a specific error. Subjects in the 
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treatment groups were presented with their superior's 
hypothesis about the error and were asked to generate six 
errors that might have caused fluctuations in the current 
year's ratios from last year's ratios. The control group 
received no prior hypotheses about the errors and were asked 
to list seven possible causes of the error. In addition, 
subjects were aksed to list the three most recent errors they 
encountered and to rate the frequency which they perceived a 
list of ten errors to occur in audits of manufacturing 
firms. An additional thiry-one audit managers were asked 
only to estimate the relative frequency that twelve types of 
financial statement errors occur in audits of manufacturing 
firms. 
The results indicated that a recency bias had occurred. 
For example, the most recently experienced errors were more 
frequently cited as causes of the fluctuations of the 
financial ratios than errors not recently cited. The 
correlation, between the frequency which errors were generated 
as hypotheses and the ratings made by the second group of 
subjects of the frequency to which they perceived these 
errors to occur for all audits of manufacturing firms, was 
highly significant (P < .01). 
Libby also tested the extent to which auditors' 
tendency towards conservatism would influence their 
perception of error frequency. He found that errors which 
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potentially could overstate net income and liquidity were 
cited significantly more often than errors which could 
possibly undersate net income and liquidity (P < .001 for 
sales errors, and P < .011 for purchase errors). Since the 
generation of hypotheses has been documented to be an 
integral component of a diagnostic task such as that 
performed by an analytical review (e.g., Elstein, Shulman and 
Sprafka, 1978), future studies should look at its impact on 
other parts of the analytical review judgment. Libby 
mentions how he did not have subjects identify unexpected 
fluctuations in account balances or determine the work they'd 
undertake to investigate these fluctuations. Those two 
judgments are examined in this study. Table 2.3 summarizes 
the results of the studies investigating analytical review 
based judgments. 
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Table 2.3 
Summary.of Stud i es of Judgment in Analytical Review 
Study Kinney and Uecker 
(1982) 
B1ocher, Esposito 
and Willingham 
(1983) 
Subjects 154 audit seniors 44 auditors 
a. 32 audit 
supervisors 
b. 12 audit 
seniors. 
Analytical 1. Set up boundary 1. Develop an 
Review Based conditions for audit program 
Task non-investigation 
of unaudited gross 
profit %. 
and time-budget 
for payrol1 
expense. 
2. Using analytical 
review identify 
the payrol1 
expense accounts 
needing 
additional audit 
work. 
Relevant 1. Anchoring and 1 . Extent of tests 
Variables of adjustment of detai Is in 
Interest heuristic, 
a. Unaudited book 
prior year’s 
audit. 
balance as 
either high or 1ow. 
2. Checklist of 
suggested 
analytical review 
procedu res. 
Relevant 1. Unaudited book 1. High variability 
Res u1ts values had an 
impact on non¬ 
investigation 
intervals, 
a. For lower 
boundary the 
in time-budget 
allocation 
between tests of 
details and 
analytical 
review. 
effect is 
significant 
(P < .01). 
b. For upper 
2. Most revisions of 
last year's audit 
work reduced 
testing. 
boundary the 
effect is less 
pronounced 
(P < .09). 
3. Providing a 
checklist 
resulted in 
greater use of 
I 
Kinney and Uecker 
(1982) continued 
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Blocher, Esposito 
and Willingham 
(1983) continued 
a more 1 engthy 
audit program. 
4. In the aggregate 
subjects 
perceived tests 
of detaiIs and 
analytical review 
to be substitute 
substantive 
tests. 
Study Holder (1983) Biggs and Wild 
(1985) 
Subjects 35 audit seniors Experiment One - 
from national, 121 auditors. 
reg i onalf and Experiment Two - 
local firms. 24 123 auditors. 
classified large The experience of 
firm participants, subjects for both 
11 classified as experiments ranged 
small firm from 1 ess than one 
participants. year to more than 
twenty-four years. 
Analytical Analyze case study to: Experiment One: 
Review Based a. Devise and 1. Estimate Gross 
Task implement a program Profit % and 
analytical review establish a 
procedu res. noninvestiga- 
b. Identify audit risk tion 95% 
areas. Confidence In¬ 
terval s. 
Relevant 1. The manner in Experiment One: 
Variables of which different 1. Variations in 
Interest analytical the amount of 
review procedures audited 
are used in the information 
pianning stages available. 
by audit a. two years. 
practitioners. b. five years. 
2. Firm size impact 2. The presence 
on analytical or absence of 
review procedures unaudited 
used. information. 
Experiment Two: 
1. The impact of 
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Blocher, Esposito 
and Willingham 
( 1 983 ) continued 
six different 
deterministic 
time-series 
patterns. 
Relevant Based on all Experiment One: 
Results subjects the most 1 . Judgments were 
extensively used biased in the 
procedu res. directi on of 
a. Inventory unaudited book 
tu mover ( 85 . 7% ) values. 
b. Gross Margin (82.9%) 2. The bias was 
c. Accounts Receivable partial 1 y 
Aging Analysis mitigated by 
(80.0%). providing 1ong 
d. Plant Asset Level - information 
Trend Analysis sets. This 
(68.6%). implies that 
e. Inventory Level - the amount of 
Trend Analysis information 
(65.7%) supplied did 
f. Accounts Receivable not affect the 
Level - Trend the auditor's 
Analysis (65.7%). confidence in 
2. No significant his decisions. 
difference in Experiment Two: 
analytical review 1. Subjects were 
procedures used by more accurate 
members of small for increasing 
firms versus large trends than 
firms. decreasing 
trends. 
2. Subjects more 
accurate for 
linear and log 
patterns than 
for exponential 
patterns. 
Study Libby ( 1 985) Biggs, Mock and 
Watkins (1985) 
Subj ects Hypothesis generation 4 auditors 
task - thirty-seven a. 2 seniors. 
audit managers. 
Frequency rating task 
Thirty-one additional 
audit managers. 
b. 2 managers. 
48 
_ 
Libby (1985) continued Biggs, Mock and 
Watkins (1985) 
continued 
Analytical 1. Generate possible Analyze case study 
Review Based errors which caused in which the client 
Task f1uctuations in 
financial profi1e 
of firm. 
was having problems 
with an account i n 
sales and collection 
2. List errors they 
recent 1y 
experienced 
cycle. Subjects were 
to 
a. Prepare and 
3. Estimate the 
relative frequency 
of a number of 
financial statement 
errors for 
manufacturing firms. 
imp1 ernent a 
program of 
analytical 
review proce¬ 
dures. 
b. Evaluate and make 
revisions to the 
pianned substan¬ 
tive program. 
Relevant 1. Availability and 1. The types of 
Variables perceived frequency information 
of Interest of error occurence. auditors use 
2. The impact of 
recently 
experiencing an 
error on generation 
of hypotheses. 
in analytical 
review. 
2. The decision 
process auditors 
use in analytical 
3. The role of 
conservatism. 
review. 
3. The impact of 
4. The effect of experience on 
listing superior ' s information 
hypothesis of error. acquistion, 
I 
i 
information 
evaluation, and 
the final 
decision made. 
Relevant 1. Strong relationship 1. All subjects 
Results between ratings of pinpointed 
error occurrence 
and the error being 
the error in 
accounts 
j generated as a receivable. 
; hypothesis. 2. Analytical 
1 
i 2. More recently review was 
experienced errors 
were cited more 
frequently as 
possible hypotheses. 
| 
used to extend 
substantive 
testing but not 
to reduce it. 
1 
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Libby (1985) continued 
3. Tendency towards 
conservatism 
strongly influenced 
types of errors 
cited (overstatement 
of net income rather 
than understatement). 
4. Inc1 one 1usive effect 
of receiving the 
inherited hypothesis. 
Biggs, Mock and 
Watkins (1985) 
continued_ 
3. Managers and 
seniors acquired 
and evaluated 
information 
differently. 
Experience 
appears to have 
i n f1uenced 
managers to 
understand 
complex inter- 
relationships 
between the 
analytical 
review results 
and audit work. 
i 
C H A P T E R III 
Design of the Experiment 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine if a 
conservatism tendency among auditors will influence auditors 
to use analytical review procedures to extend substantive 
testing but not to reduce the scope of audit work. Other 
objectives are to assess the effect of internal control 
reliability, experience and the type of information used on 
the utilization and reliance upon analytical review as a 
substantive test. This is tested by examining subjects' 
responses in a case study depicting the sales and collection 
cycle of an audit. Subjects were asked to use analytical 
review procedures as a substantive test to evaluate unaudited 
book values of accounts relevant to the sales and collection 
cycle. Given this data, subjects rendered a judgment on 
whether and to what degree they would modify the planned 
tests of details. 
Case Selection, Case Description, and Subjects 
The task setting involved a case study of the sales and 
collection cycle of an audit for a small to mid-size 
wholesale consumer products company. This setting is 
partially adapted from the case developed by Holder (1983) 
and modified by Biggs et al. (1985). Consequently, this 
allows some comparability between the results from this study 
and those found in their respective studies. In addition, 
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smaller companies were found by Hylas and Ashton (1982) to be 
most susceptible to account balance errors. For those 
companies, the most important account balance errors tend to 
occur in the sales and collection cycle. 
The case was first developed from the setting used in 
the Biggs et a 1. study. It was then modified by discussions 
conducted with seven practicing auditors (three managers, one 
principal, and three partners) from national and regional 
firms, and through audit programs used by the firms to assist 
the auditors in planning and implementing an audit. Five 
more experienced auditors (three managers, one principal, and 
one partner) and five less experienced auditors (all seniors) 
took part in a pre-test in which they designed a detailed 
substantive audit program for the sales and collection cycle 
after receiving a brief description of the hypothetical 
client. During the pre-test auditors were asked to allocate 
audit hours to tests of details. The mean response of audit 
hours from the pre-test was used to establish a base rate for 
a sample audit plan. This process was necessary to ensure 
the face validity of the task. 
Given this preliminary work, five types of information 
were made available to the subjects: 
1. A brief description of the internal control system and 
results of compliance testing relevant to the sales and 
collection cycle. 
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2. Two years of audited financial statements and this 
year's unaudited account balances. It was presented in 
both absolute numbers and in common size terms. To 
facilitate the task, key ratios and trends relevant for 
implementing an analytical review of the sales and 
collection cycle were provided. From discussions held 
with practicing auditors, it was evident that computer 
software was used to generate an output containing 
trends and key ratios. The ratios and trends presented 
were based upon the analytical review procedures considered 
most important in the surveys of auditors cited in the 
literature review (e.g., Holder, 1983; Daroca and Wilder, 
1985; and Biggs and Wild, 1984) data. 
3. Industry data for ratios relevant to the sales and 
collection cycle. The average industry norms were 
adapted from a source used by at least two national 
accounting firms, the "Robert Morris Associates Annual 
Statement Studies." 
4. Regression analysis based estimates of relevant sales 
and collection accounts. Subjects were told that the 
regression formulas were derived using four years of 
audited quarterly data to estimate the unaudited current 
year's account balances. 
5. A description of planned tests of details for the sales 
and collection cycle. The audit plan was described to 
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subjects as being typical for a firm in this industry 
possessing an adequate internal control system. It was 
further noted that the plan involved tests of details only 
and did not consider analytical review results. 
Subjects 
One criterion for subject selection was that they have 
experience in planning an audit and using analytical review 
procedures. From discussions held with practicing auditors, 
it became evident that seniors and managers could both be 
used as subjects. Audit planning and the implementation of 
the audit work are initiated by the senior and reviewed by 
the manager, whose work in turn is reviewed by the partner in 
charge. Trotman (1985, p. 740) states, "The review process 
is an integral part of the standard operating procedures of 
audit firms." 
Since one of the objectives of the study is to test the 
role of experience in the utilization of analytical review 
procedures, an equal number of questionnaires were 
distributed to managers and seniors. The use of practicing 
auditors, rather than students, as subjects is important 
because as Libby (1985, p. 649) points out, "Auditors bring a 
wealth of task related knowledge to the audit, acquired 
through years of training and experience. This is a key 
attribute that differentiates audit decision making from many 
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decision contexts examined in cognitive psychology." 
Seven "Big Eight" firms and another large national 
accounting firm provided subjects from offices in Boston, 
Hartford, and New York. To ensure that the task was taken 
seriously, the questionnaires were distributed by a partner 
in each office. A total of one hundred and sixty eight 
questionnaires were distributed. Each of the partners 
received two follow-up phone calls. This resulted in ninety 
six questionnaires returned for a response rate of 57.14%. 
See Table 3.1 for a breakdown of response rate of subjects by 
firm and in total. 
Table 3.1 
Response Rate of Subjects by Firm and in Total 
Responses Questionnaires Response 
Firm Received Distributed Rate 
Price Waterhouse 
Peat, Marwick, and 
21 28 75.00% 
Mitchell 17 40 42.50% 
Arthur Young 14 18 77.78% 
Arthur Andersen 13 20 65.00% 
Coopers and Lybrand 12 20 60.00% 
Laventhol and Horwath 9 14 64.29% 
Ernst and Whinney 8 8 100.00% 
Touche Ross 2 20 10.00% 
"Total 96 168 57.14% 
Experimental Task 
In this experiment, subjects were asked to generate two 
decisions: 
1. Using analytical review procedures, they were to 
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determine whether any of the following sales and 
collection cycle unaudited account balances might 
possibly need an adjustment. 
a. Sales, 
b. Sales Returns and Allowances, 
c. Bad Debt expense, 
d. Accounts Receivable, 
e. Allowance for Doubtful Accounts, and 
f. Cash. 
2. Determine if any modifications should be applied to 
the tests of details planned for the sales and 
col 1ection cycle. 
In order to make the experiment manageable to the 
subjects, only one cycle of the audit is examined. The sales 
and collection cycle is being used because this research is 
extending the work of Biggs et al. (1985). In that study, 
analytical review procedures pointed to an error in the 
unaudited balance of accounts receivable. Arens and 
Loebbecke (1980) list six sales and collection cycle 
accounts; sales, sales returns and allowances, bad debt 
expense, accounts receivable, allowance for doubtful 
accounts, and cash. Although cash is intertwined with 
other cycles of an audit (e.g., acquisition and payment 
cycle), it is included because there are audit tests 
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specifically tailored to examine the cash collections 
directly related to the sales and collection cycle. 
The second decision involves the modification, if any is 
needed, to the planned tests of details. It was 
operationalized in the following manner. Subjects examined 
the basic audit plan which was developed in the preliminary 
discussions and pre-tests held with practicing auditors. 
Subjects were told that this plan was typical for companies 
in this industry possessing an adequate internal control 
system. They were asked to make changes, if any are needed, 
to the nature and quantity of testing. The rationale for 
including a question on modifications to the extent of the 
testing is because in the pre-test auditors indicated that 
the results of analytical review would most likely impact on 
the volume of testing and not the types of tests conducted. 
For the second decision to have any research or 
practical implications, it was essential to design an audit 
plan which is realistic. To implement this goal, two 
approaches were used. First, the nature of tests to be 
conducted were derived from a review of substantive audit 
program guides obtained from a number of large national 
accounting firms. Second, ten practicing auditors (three 
managers, one principal, one partner, and five seniors) were 
asked to determine the extent of testing (the nature of tests 
were listed) for a hypothetical audit. The auditors were 
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provided with the current year's financial data and were told 
that the firm possessed an adequate internal control system. 
The auditors were asked to design the audit plan assuming no 
analytical review procedures are performed. This involved 
allocating audit hours to twelve categories of tests of 
details. The mean response in hours allocated for each 
category of audit work was used to establish the typical 
1 
audit plan. Margheim (1986) argues that an advantage to 
presenting subjects with a base plan, in planned audit hours, 
is that it probably would serve as an anchor. This, in turn, 
should reduce the high variability found in previous studies 
which examined auditors' judgments concerning the allocation 
of audit work (e.g., Joyce, 1976; Wright and Mock, 1986). 
Appendix A contains a description of the pre-test used to 
generate the sample audit plan. 
After completing the case, subjects were asked to 
complete a questionnaire. In addition to biographical and 
background data, subjects evaluated the importance different 
types of information had as inputs to their analytical review 
based judgments. This was implemented in the following 
manner. On a seven point Likert-type scale subjects were 
One manager's response was thrown out for being an outlier. 
Without this subject included, the mean total hours was 46.78 
with a standard deviation of 10.43. With this subject included, 
the mean response increases to 52.20 hours with a standard 
deviation of 19.76. 
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asked to evaluate the degree of importance they attributed 
to financial statement based ratio analysis, financial 
statement based trend analysis, industry comparisons, 
and the regression analysis generated estimates. Separate 
analyses were conducted on subjects' judgments to allow an 
indirect test on the effect different types of information 
have on analytical review judgments. 
The final component of the questionnaire addressed the 
role of attitudes on analytical review judgments. It is 
strictly exploratory in nature and asked subjects to assess 
on a seven point Likert-type scale their perception of the 
strength of analytical review as a substantive test. The 
length of the questionnaire was 15 pages. The mean time to 
complete the questionnaire was 42.33 minutes (standard 
deviation of 18.98 minutes). 
Summary of Design 
Three treatment variables are manipulated: 
1. Results of analytical review procedures either pointing 
to an error or not pointing to an error in account balances. 
2. The reliability of the sales and collection cycle 
internal control system, and 
3. Experience of the auditor. 
Each of the treatment variables has two levels that are 
constant which results in a fixed effects model. 
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Analytical review results are manipulated to test if 
auditors are using analytical review procedures to reduce as 
well as extend planned substantive testing. Analytical 
review results either pointed to an error or no error in the 
unadjusted balances of accounts receivable, allowance for 
doubtful accounts, and bad debt expense. For all subjects, 
the analytical review results pointed to no errors for the 
unadjusted balances of sales, sales returns and allowances, 
and cash. The error involved an overstatement of accounts 
receivable and the allowance for doubtful accounts due to 
failure to write off questionable accounts. 
The error for bad debt expense is less clear cut. It is 
assumed that the bad debt expense should be adjusted upwards 
for the current year because of the increasing problem of 
customers not paying off their open accounts. One could 
argue that no adjustment for bad debt expense should be made 
based on only three years of data. However, for the subjects 
who received analytical review results pointing to the error, 
forty-four (84.6%) did decide that bad debt expense might 
need an adjustment. This is opposed to fifteen subjects 
(34.1%) from the groups which received analytical review 
results pointing to no error. 
The error in accounts receivable was adapted from the 
error used in the Biggs et a 1. (1985) study. That error had 
resulted in an adjustment rendered by an auditing firm to an 
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actual client. The modifications involve increasing the 
balance of accounts receivable and the allowance for doubtful 
accounts and changing the aging schedule in order that the 
error be more pronounced. This should result in a cleaner 
experimental manipulation of analytical review results. This 
was informally confirmed during the pretest involving the 
development of the sample audit plan. After completing the 
pretest, auditors were asked to examine the financial data 
and analytical review procedures which either pointed to an 
error or did not point to an error (the financial data and 
analytical review results for both the error and no error 
cases are found in Appendix C). For the five auditors who 
received the financial data pointing to error, the mean 
number of accounts which possibly needed an adjustment was 3, 
while for the other five auditors the mean number of possible 
adjustments was 0.8. 
As an additional internal validity check, analysis was 
performed on the number of unaudited account balances 
subjects determined might need and adjustment. The analysis 
was performed separately for the number of adjustments made 
to all six accounts, to the three problem accounts and to the 
three non-problem accounts. It was expected that subjects 
who receive analytical review procedures pointing to an error 
will make adjustments to a significantly greater degree than 
subjects receiving analytical review procedures not pointing 
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to an error. 
Since the judgment analyzed is a dichotomous decision 
(adjustment/no adjustment), a Chi-Square test was performed. 
For the analysis conducted on all six accounts and on the 
problem accounts, the analytical review manipulation was 
significant at the .001 level. In the non-problem accounts, 
analytical review was significant at the .05 level. This 
latter result was perhaps caused because subjects who had 
received the manipulation of analytical review signalling 
errors in some accounts had been somewhat cautious in their 
1 
assessment of possible adjustments in the other accounts. 
The conclusion from the Chi-Square tests is that the 
analytical review manipulation was effective. Subjects who 
received analytical review results pointing to possible 
account balance errors, made a significantly greater number 
of adjustments. Therefore, the analytical review 
manipulation appears to be valid to test if auditors are 
conservative in their use of analytical review results. 
The reliability of the internal control system was 
1 One possible confounding factor to the analysis was that 
subjects might have interpreted differently, the question 
of whether an account may possibly need an adjustment. At 
least two subjects interpreted the question in a very 
restrictive and conservative fashion. Both subjects 
expressed the opinion that until they had examined all of 
the audit evidence they could not rule out the possibility 
that an account needed an adjustment. Hence, they marked 
yes to all six accounts as possibly requiring an 
adjustment. Other subjects could have at least been 
influenced by this line of reasoning. 
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manipulated as stronger or weaker. To establish the face 
validity of the manipulation, twenty-eight questionnaires 
were mailed to audit professionals (not taking part in the 
experiment) who were randomly assigned to two groups. 
Subjects in each group were asked to examine a different 
internal control system for the sales and collection cycle, 
and evaluate on a ten point Likert-type scale the degree of 
reliance they would place on the internal control system when 
designing the substantive audit plan. The scale was anchored 
by (1) "No Reliance" and (10) "Maximum Reliance." The 
question and scale is patterned after one used by Libby, 
Artman and Willingham (1985). They argue that the use of a 
ten point scale will, (p. 221) "attempt to allow the auditors 
to make fine distinctions among internal control systems, 
while maintaining the tie to the actual scale used in 
practice." See Appendix B for a description of the two 
different internal control systems. A priori, it was 
expected that the difference between the evaluations of the 
two systems would be statistically significant. Twenty-three 
responses were received for a response rate of 82.1%. The 
mean (standard deviation) ranking assigned by the groups was 
4.0 (1.7) for the group which had the description of the 
weaker system, and a 7.0 (1.7) for the group which had the 
description of the stronger system. A T-test demonstrated 
that the evaluations were significantly different between the 
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two groups (P < .001). 
The role of experience was manipulated by distributing 
an equal number of questionnaires to seniors and managers. 
All seniors and managers were required to have performed 
analytical review judgments. The fact that subjects are 
already in the position of senior or manager creates some 
constraints in interpreting the results of the experience 
variable. This will be discussed in detail when describing 
limitations of the study. The mean (standard deviation) 
number of years of auditing experience was 3.04 (1.16) for 
seniors and 6.26 (1.58) for managers which a T-test found to 
be significantly different (P < .001). Other significant 
experience differences between seniors and managers were 
found for the degree of supervisory experience in audit 
planning (P < .001), the degree of experience in using 
analytical review procedures (P < .01) and the degree of 
experience in using statistically-based analytical review 
procedures (P < .05). All of the differences were in the 
expected direction of managers having more experience than 
seniors. Table 3.2 presents a summary of these tests of the 
manipulation of experience. 
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Table 3.2 
-Summary of T-tests on Experience Manipulation 
Var i a b 1 e Mean Std. Dev. T-v a 1u e P 
1 . Years of experience 
Seniors 3.04 1.16 
-11.43 .001 
Managers 6.26 1 . 58 
2. Supervisory Audit Experience -5.43 .001 
Seniors 4.82 1.45 
Managers 6.17 0.90 
3. Experience in Using 
Review Procedures 
Analytical 
-2. 56 .006 
Seniors 5. 36 1 . 35 
Managers 5.96 0.83 
4. Experience in Using Statistical 
-1.97 . 027 Analytical Review Procedures 
1 . 33 Seniors 2.10 
Managers 2.70 1 . 63 
Note: Variables 2-4 are based on a seven point Likert-type 
scale anchored by (1) "No Experience" and (7) "Great 
Degree of Experience." For all four of the above 
tests, there were fifty seniors and forty-six managers. 
The tests are based upon a pooled variance estimate. All 
tests showed similar levels of significance when utilizing 
a separate variance estimate. Since it was expected 
that managers would have more experience than seniors, 
all levels of significance are presented for a one-tailed 
test. ----- 
For the purposes of the experiment, each factor will be 
considered orthogonal and each level for the factors will be 
fixed. This results in a between subjects 2x2x2 fixed 
effects model. Twenty-one questionnaires were randomly 
assigned to one of the eight cells for a total of one hundred 
and sixty-eight. Responses were received from ninety-six 
subjects. Appendix C contains the questionnaire administered 
65 
to subjects. See Figure 3.1 for a breakdown of subjects by 
cell and by each of the levels of the independent variables. 
Figure 3.1 
Breakdown of Subjects by Cell and by Independent Variable 
Seji i.£JSl 
I. C. Weak I. C. Strong 
An. Re v. Signals Error 13 1 5 28 
An. Re v. Signals No Error 
i 
12 1 10 22 
25 25 
Manaqers 
I. C. Weak I. C. Strong 
An. Rev. Signals E r r or 11 13 
_i 
24 
An. Re v. Signals No Error 11 ii i 
i 
22 
22 24 
All Subjects: 96 
Analytical Review Signals Error: 52 
Analytical Review Signals No Error: 44 
Internal Control Weak: 47 
Internal Control Strong: 49 
Seniors: 50 
Managers: 46 
The eight treatment groups are: 
Group 1: Analytical review procedures pointing to 
an error, weaker internal control system, and seniors. 
Group 2. Analytical review procedures not pointing to 
an error, weaker internal control system, and seniors. 
Group 3. Analytical review procedures pointing to an 
error, stronger internal control system, and seniors. 
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Group 4. Analytical review procedures not pointing to an 
error, stronger internal control system, and seniors. 
Groups 5-8. Same as groups 1-4 except managers are used 
as subjects instead of seniors. 
Hypotheses and Statistical Tests 
A three factor ANOVA is utilized to investigate the 
effects of conservatism, internal control reliability, and 
experience, on the extent, if any, subjects will modify the 
planned tests of details. F-tests were conducted to 
determine if there are any significant main effects and 
significant interaction effects for the following model. 
where: V is the judgment. (_1) 
-M is the overall constant or grand mean. 
CX is the analytical review procedures effect. 
(3 is the internal control. 
^ is the experience effect. 
£ is the experimental error and is di s tr i buted 
The error term is nested within each individual observation. 
All other terms are interaction effects. 
The dependent variable, the extent to which subjects 
will modify the planned tests of details, is operationalized 
as foilows: 
(a) Number of hours of planned tests of details. This 
measures the total number of hours a subject allocates to 
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tests of details. The base rate for the testing is forty- 
seven hours. 
(b) Net change in audit tests where the extent of testing 
increased or decreased. For example, if a subject increases 
five tests and decrease three tests, the net change in audit 
tests is a positive change of two tests. 
(c) Net weighted average change in audit tests where the 
extent of testing increased or decreased. To capture the 
direction of the weighted average change in audit tests, the 
weighted average change in tests which were decreased are 
subtracted from the weighted average change in tests which 
were increased. 
The experimental model is employed to test each of the 
procedures applied to operationalize the dependent variable. 
Simila‘r to the Blocher et a 1 . (1983) study, equal weighting 
will be given to each of the audit tests. They argue (p. 
86), "We have chosen to weigh all steps equally in the 
analysis, as any other weighting scheme would be more 
controversial." The rationale for including a net change 
approach to operationalizing the dependent variable is to 
ensure that the direction of the modifications is in the 
direction expected. For example, it is expected that the 
groups which have analytical review procedures pointing to an 
error will be likely to make modifications whose net result 
will be to increase the extent of testing. 
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A similar analysis was also separately conducted on the 
modifications made by subjects to the audit plan for accounts 
in which an error occurs (e.g., accounts receivable and the 
related accounts of allowance for doubtful accounts and bad 
debt expense) and the modifications applied to the audit plan 
for accounts in which no error occurs (e.g., sales, sales 
returns and allowances, and cash). This was considered to 
ensure that the changes implemented by subjects to the sample 
audit plan were primarily made to the problem accounts and 
not to the non-problem accounts. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are analyzed within the 
framework of the experimental design. 
1. Whether analytical review procedures point to an error 
or not will have no effect on the extent subjects will modify 
the planned tests of details. 
One objective of this study is to detect if the results 
of analytical review procedures will have an effect on 
modifications made to planned audit work. It is expected 
that subjects who receive analytical review results 
signalling errors will allocate more hours to tests of 
details than subjects who receive analytical review results 
signalling no errors. In addition, the role of conservatism 
on the use of analytical review results will be examined. 
Although no one has directly tested the impact of 
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conservatism, a factor that differentiates the results in the 
audit decision making literature from findings in the 
psychology literature appears to be the influence of 
conservatism (e.g., Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Tomassini, et 
a 1 ., 1982; Kida, 1984; Libby, 1985; Biggs, et a 1 ., 1985;). 
Because of this conservatism tendency, one would expect that 
if the analytical review procedures point to an error, 
auditors will likely extend the audit plan. However, if the 
analytical review procedures do not point to an error, 
auditors will most likely not modify the audit plan to reduce 
the nature and extent of the tests of details. The 
conservatism tendency will be investigated by comparing the 
total hours allocated to the base rate of forty-seven hours. 
2. The reliability of the internal control system will have 
no effect on the extent subjects will modify the planned 
tests of details. 
The official auditing literature (SAS 23) suggests that 
auditors consider the reliability of the information when 
implementing analytical review procedures. Joyce and Biddle 
(1981b), and Bamber (1983) found that auditors are sensitive 
to the reliability of information when tested in a with in¬ 
subjects design. However, Joyce and Biddle (1981b) did not 
find this result in a between-subjects design. Consequently, 
whether auditors will be sensitive to the reliability of the 
information when using analytical review is open to question. 
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3. Experience will have no effect on the extent subjects 
will modify the planned tests of details. 
The literature on the effect of experience on auditors' 
judgments has been mixed. However, for more complex tasks, 
such as materiality judgments, experience does have a 
positive impact on the decisions (e.g., Messier, 1983). 
Since the task in this study is complex (using the analytical 
review results to modify the nature and extent of the audit 
work), it is expected that managers and seniors will differ 
in their modifications to the audit plan. 
4. There is no interaction between analytical review 
results and internal control reliability. 
One would expect to reject this hypothesis. If the 
results of the analytical review procedures point to an error 
and the reliability of the internal control system is not 
strong, then the interaction effect should influence auditors 
to significantly increase the planned tests of details. The 
increase is likely to be greater than that which would occur 
from the main effects only. This should transpire because 
the auditor is looking for results of substantive procedures 
(e.g., analytical review) to corroborate the previous work of 
the audit (e.g., his evaluation of the internal control 
system). Moreover, Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) assert that 
relying substantially upon analytical review results only 
makes sense if the analytical review procedures are generated 
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from numbers that emanate from a reliable system. Therefore, 
it is expected that there will be a significant interaction 
between the analytical review results and the reliability of 
the internal control system. 
5. There is no interaction between analytical review results 
and experience. 
From the findings of the Biggs et a 1. (1985) study, one 
would anticipate that the more experienced managers will only 
modify the nature and extent of tests of details that examine 
the account balances in which errors might have occurred. 
However, the less experienced seniors may modify tests 
concerning the whole sales and collection cycle. This would 
transpire because the managers are expected to be more 
effective than the seniors in understanding the subtle and 
complex link between analytical review results and audit work. 
6. There is no interaction between internal control 
reliability and experience. 
In the review of the literature on internal control 
evaluations, Ashton (1983) concluded that experience had an 
inconclusive influence. He attributes this result to the 
relatively simple and discrete nature of internal control 
judgments. Accordingly, one would not expect a significant 
interaction between internal control reliability and 
experience. 
7. There will be no interaction between the analytical 
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review results, internal control reliability, and experience. 
The literature on expert decision making (e.g. Elstein 
et a 1 ., 1978; Chi et a 1., 1981; Charness, 1981; Biggs and 
Mock, 1983) indicates that there should be a significant 
interaction between experience and the ability to perform 
tasks which involve an understanding of complex 
interrelationships between variables. As a result, one would 
expect that managers and seniors will differ in their ability 
to integrate different parts of the audit work to determine 
whether any modifications are needed to the planned tests of 
details. 
Other hypotheses of interest examined in this study 
fo1 low. 
8. Subjects who attach greater importance to regression 
analysis review procedures will have a greater tendency to 
modify planned tests of details in both directions ( i .e., 
reduce, as well as extend) than subjects who attach less 
importance to the regression analysis analytical review 
procedures. 
To generate systematic variance, two groups are formed 
based on the subjects' responses to the question regarding the 
importance they attribute to the regression analysis output. 
A seven-point scale was used, anchored by (1) "Extremely 
Unimportant" and (7) "Extremely Important". Subjects with 
responses below the median response (4) were assigned to one 
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group and those subjects with responses above the.median were 
assigned to another group. 
Although this is an exploratory indirect test, it is 
likely that subjects using quantitative information rely more 
on analytical review as a substantive test. It is expected 
that those using quantitative information will have a greater 
tendency to modify planned tests of details in both 
directions (i.e., reduce as well as extend). As Wallace 
(1981) points out, auditors, using regression analysis for 
analytical review procedures, would have some objective piece 
of information to rely upon in case of possible litigation 
suits. 
9. Subjects who perceive analytical review to be a strong 
substantive test will modify the planned tests of details to 
the same extent as those who perceive analytical review to be 
a weak substantive test. 
Blocher et al. (1983) found, in a test of the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic, that subjects, in the aggregate, 
perceived analytical review procedures and tests of details 
to be substitute tests. Furthermore, Biggs and Wild (1984), 
in a survey of auditors, discovered that there was a strong 
relationship between the perceived value of analytical review 
procedures and its usage. Hence, the test for this 
hypothesis will examine if there exists a discrepancy between 
the perceptions auditors have concerning the strength of 
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analytical review procedures, and their utilization of 
analytical review results. 
Subjects were asked to evaluate the strength of 
analytical review procedures as substantive tests. A seven- 
point scale was employed, anchored by (1) "Extremely Weak" 
and (7) "Extremely Strong". Subjects with responses below 
the median response (5) were assigned to one group, and those 
subjects with responses above the median were placed in 
another group. 
CHAPTER IV 
Data Analysis and Results 
This chapter presents (1) the descriptive statistics in 
total, by cell, and by independent variable for each of the 
dependent variables, (2) the results of the 2x2x2 ANOVA and 
subsequent statistical tests performed, (3) the statistical 
analysis examining the impact of the perceived importance of 
regression data on audit plan modifications, and (4) the 
statistical analysis investigating the impact of the 
perceived strength of analytical review tests on audit hours 
al 1 ocated. 
Input to the Data Analysis 
Ninety-six subjects took part in the study. Each 
subject's response was analyzed for the modifications 
rendered to the hours of the complete audit plan, and as 
supporting analysis, the number of tests modified were 
examined. 
The major emphasis is placed upon the dependent variable 
total hours because ultimately it is the total hours of the 
audit and not the number of tests modified which most 
influences the cost of the audit. Supplementary analysis was 
conducted on the number of tests modified to allow a 
comparison between this study and the Blocher et al. (1983) 
study. 
ANOVA with Unequal Cell Size and Heterogeneous Variances 
Because of the problem of unequal cell size, the 
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classical experimental design of ANOVA is not appropriate 
(Herr, 1986). Instead, the analysis was conducted utilizing 
the Regression option of ANOVA in SPSS which allows the 
researcher to test hypotheses about unweighted cell means. 
To guard against problems due to the lack of homogeneity 
1 
of variances between cells , the Brown-Forsythe ANOVA 
procedure in BMDP7D was performed on all dependent variables 
using the group as a factor. This procedure, which is robust 
to violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption, 
produced similar results as those found when utilizing the 
Regression option of ANOVA in SPSS. 
Analysis of Total Hours: Total Audit Plan 
The first set of statistical analyses concerns the 
modifications rendered to the total hours of the audit plan. 
The variable, total hours, measures the total number of hours 
a subject allocated to tests of details. The base rate for 
the testing is forty-seven hours. The means and standard 
deviations for total audit hours planned are reported in 
Figure 4.1, while the statistical analysis is presented in 
Table 4.1. 
1 The results from the Levene test for equality of variances, 
which Brown and Forsythe (1974) demonstrated to be robust 
to non-normality of data, found that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was in order for all tests except 
for the net weighted average number of tests for the total 
audit and the total hours of the non-problem accounts. For 
those tests, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
violated at the .01 level of significance. 
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Figure 4.1 
Means (Standard Deviations) for Audit Hours: Total Audit 
Seniors 
I.C. Weak I.C. Strong 
An. Rev. Signals Error (63. 54 ( 1 5.43) 
i 
61.27 (14.69). 62.23 
1(14.80) 
_ _ i 
An. Rev. Signals No Error 64.13 (12.64) 
i 
49.35 (10.38) 57.41 
1 (13.66) 
63.82 (13.87) 56.50 (14.20) 
Managers 
I.C. Weak I.C. Strong 
An. Rev. Signals Error 69.55 (16.63) 58. 39 ( 9.40) 63. 50 
(14.09) 
An. Re v. Signals No Error 54.86 (9.71) 53. 91 (12.22) 54.39 
(10.78) 
62.21 (15.27) 56.33 (10.78) 
Base Rate: 47.00 
All Subjects: 59.67 (13.81) 
Analytical Review Signals Error: 62.87 (14.35) 
Analytical Review Signals No Error: 55.90 (12.26) 
Internal Control Weak: 63.09 (14.30) 
Internal Control Strong: 56.43 (12.64) 
Seniors: 60.16 (14.38) 
Managers: 59.14 (13.30) 
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Table 4.1 
Analysis of Variance for Audit Hours: Total Audit 
Source of Variation D. F. M. S. F P 
Main Effects 
Analytical Review (AR) 1 1379.55 8.17 .005 
Internal Control (IC) 1 1264.54 7.49 . 008 
Experience (EXP) 1 4. 14 0.03 . 876 
Two-Way Interactions 
AR x IC 1 8.62 0.05 .822 
AR x EXP 1 92.62 0.59 . 461 
IC x EXP 1 34.13 0.08 . 654 
Three-Way Interaction 
AR x IC x EXP 1 752.51 4.46 .038 
Residual 88 168.93 
The main effects for analytical review and internal control 
are significant (P < .01) as is the three-way interaction 
(P < .05). The effect for analytical review indicates that 
as analytical review signals errors more hours are assigned 
to the audit plan. However, subjects did not use the case 
of analytical review signalling no errors to reduce the hours 
of the audit plan, when compared to the base rate of forty- 
seven hours. For example, an examination of Figure 4.1 shows 
that for the best scenario of analytical review signalling no 
errors and a strong internal control, the seniors allocated 
49.35 hours and managers assigned 53.91 hours. 
Similarly, the effect for internal control indicates is 
that for a weak internal control system, more hours are 
assigned. For a weak system, 63.09 hours were allocated as 
opposed to 56.43 hours for a strong system. Thus, it appears 
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that in a between-subjects design, auditors are able to 
discriminate the differing reliabilities of the internal 
control systems and adjust the extent of their audit work 
accordingly. 
Although the main effect for experience was not 
significant, it appears that this occurred because of 
offsetting interactions between the cells. An examination of 
the means in Figure 4.1 suggests that a different approach 
was used by seniors and managers in determining the number of 
hours of audit planning. For seniors only, similar hours are 
assigned except when both analytical review and internal 
control are pointing to no errors (49.35 hours versus 61.27 
to 64.13 hours for the other three cells). On the other hand, 
looking at only managers, it appears that similar audit hours 
are allocated except when both analytical review and internal 
control are pointing to errors (69.55 hours versus 53.91 to 
58.39 hours for the other three cells). One possible 
explanation for these different approaches could be that 
managers are looking for at least one area to be strong to 
keep the auditing hours close to the base rate, while 
seniors are looking for at least one area to be weak to make 
large increases in testing. The contrasting behavior could 
be caused by seniors trying to gain some time flexibility in 
implementing the audit. Since the conduct of the audit 
involves a review process between seniors and managers it 
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would be interesting to examine in a future study how this 
possible conflict in planned audit hours is resolved. 
Comparing the individual cells, it becomes evident why 
the main effect for experience was not significant. For 
example, when the internal control system was weak, seniors 
allocated 63.82 hours and managers allocated 62.21 hours. 
However, for the case of analytical review results signalling 
errors and a weak internal control system, managers allocated 
more hours than seniors (69.55 versus 63.54). This 
difference reversed itself when the weak internal control 
system interacted with analytical review results signalling 
no errors (64.13 hours for seniors versus 54.86 hours for 
managers). Similarly, when the internal control system was 
strong both seniors and managers allocated approximately the 
same number of hours (56.50 and 56.33 respectively). Again, 
the individual cells showed different patterns of allocated 
hours. Seniors allocated more hours than managers when 
analytical review results signalled errors and the internal 
control system was strong (61.27 hours for seniors and 58.39 
hours for managers). Contrary to this, the managers assigned 
more hours when the analytical review results signalled no 
errors and the internal control system was strong (53.91 
hours for managers and 49.35 hours for seniors). 
Because of the offsetting effects between the cells and 
the significant three-way interaction, additional analysis 
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was conducted separately for seniors and for managers. The 
ANOVA conducted separately for seniors and for managers is 
reported in Table 4.2. For seniors, internal control is 
significant (P = .034), while for managers analytical review 
is significant (P = .011) and internal control is marginally 
1 
significant (P = .098). The effect of analytical review for 
managers is to significantly increase the hours when 
analytical review signals error (an increase of 9.11 hours 
over the case of analytical review results signalling no 
problems). For seniors, the difference in hours between 
analytical review results signalling errors and not 
signalling errors is 4.82 hours. Therefore, the seniors are 
not utilizing the results of analytical review as much as the 
managers. The effect of internal control is for seniors to 
significantly increase the hours when internal control is 
weaker (an increase of 7.32 hours over the case of a strong 
internal control system). A similar, although weaker 
tendency, is present for managers (an increase of 5.88 hours). 
1 Since there is an average of only twelve subjects per 
cell, it was decided to consider all effects up to the 
.10 level as significant. 
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Table 4.2 
Analysis of Variance for Total Hours, 
Seniors and Managers: Total Audit 
Sen i or s Managers 
Source of Variation F P F P 
Main Effects — 
Analytical Review (AR) 2. 10 .154 7.08 . 01 1 
Internal Control (IC) 4.75 . 034 2.86 . 098 
Two-Way Interaction 
AR x IC 2. 56 .117 1 . 94 . 171 
__ — 
One reason why subjects might have been conservative in 
using the results of analytical review and the description of 
the internal control system to extend testing but not to 
reduce testing is because the base rate presented could have 
been too low. However, the base rate of forty-seven hours 
was determined in a pre-test. For each category of audit 
work, the mean response from the pre-test was used to 
establish the sample audit plan. In addition, nineteen 
subjects did in fact reduce the total hours of the testing. 
Figure 4.2 presents a breakdown of subjects who reduced 
testing, by cell and by each level of the independent 
variables. 
An examination of Figure 4.2 indicates that 
approximately 20% of the subjects did reduce the hours 
allocated for tests of details. At least some subjects 
reduced testing in every cell except the case for managers 
when analytical review results signalled errors and the 
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internal control system was weak. The reduction of testing 
across the cells for some subjects suggests that the base 
rate was plausible as a benchmark to reduce, as well as 
increase testing. 
To further rule out the alternative hypothesis that the 
base rate and not a conservatism tendency caused the auditors 
to extend testing but not reduce it, a one-way ANOVA was 
performed by comparing the number of hours assigned by the 
pre-test group (46.78) and the two groups (seniors and 
managers) which received the analytical review procedures 
signalling no errors and a description of the internal 
control system being strong (49.35 hours for seniors and 
53.91 hours for managers). The F value of 1.07 (P = .358) 
leads one not to reject the hypothesis that the hours 
assigned by the pre-test groups, which was used to establish 
the base rate, was any different than the hours assigned by 
either the seniors or managers who received signals that 
everything was in order. The results of the ANOVA combined 
with the finding that nineteen subjects did reduce the 
testing indicates that the base plan was a reasonable 
starting point to either reduce or extend testing in light of 
the analytical review results and the description of the 
internal control system. 
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Figure 4.2 
Number (%) of Subjects by Cell and by Independent Variable 
Who Reduced Total Hours of Testing 
Seniors 
I.C. Weak I.C. Strong 
An. Rev. Signals Error 3 (23.07%) 3 (20.00%) 6 (21.43%) 
! 
An. Rev. Signals No Error 1 ( 8.33%) 
i __ 
4 (40.00%) 5 (22.73%) 
4 (16.00%) 7 (28.00%) 
Managers 
I.C. Weak I.C. Strong 
An. Rev. Signals Error j0 ( 0.00%) 2 (15.40%) 2 (8.33%) 
An. Rev. Signals No Errori2 (18.18%) 4 (36.36%) j 6 (27.27%) 
2 ( 9.09%) 6 (25.00%) 
All subjects: 19 (19.76%) 
Analytical Review Signals Error: 8 (15. 
Analytical Review Signals No Error: 11 
Internal control Weak: 6 (12.77%) 
Internal Control Strong: 13 (26.53%) 
Seniors: 11 (22.00%) 
Managers: 8 (17.39%) 
38%) 
(25.00%) 
Analysis of Total Hours: 
Non-Problem and Problem Accounts 
To determine what caused the results for the 
modifications made to the total audit plan, a separate set of 
analyses investigated how the subjects modified the hours of 
the non-problem accounts and how they modified the hours of 
the problem accounts. It was expected that the changes in 
total hours for the audit occurred predominately in the 
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problem accounts and not in the non-problem accounts. The 
base rate plan had assigned sixteen hours for the non-problem 
accounts and thirty-one hours for the problem accounts. 
Figure 4.3 reports the means (standard deviations) for 
the total hours of the non-problem accounts and Figure 4.4 
presents the means (standard deviations) for the total hours 
of the problem accounts. The results of the ANOVA 
conducted on the hours of the non-problem and problem 
accounts are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 
-Means (Standard Deviations) for Total Hours: 
Non-Problem Accounts 
Seniors 
I_. C^_ Weak I.C. Strong 
An. Re v. Signals E r ror 21.50 (10.86) 18. 20 (5.60) 19.73 
- 
(8.45) 
An. Re v. Signals No Er ror! 22 . 29 ( 6.63) | 17.85 (5.63) 20.27 t . 
1 j (6.46) 
21.88 ( 8.90) 18.06 (5.49) 
Managers 
I.C. Weak I. C. Strong 
An. Rev. Signals Error 25.55 (10.74) | 18.46 ( 3.89) 1 21.71 
i.. - 
I (8.43) 
An. Re v. Signals No Error!18.00 ( 4.98) 16.82 ( 7.55) * 17.41 
(6.27) 
21 .77 ( 9.03) 17.71 ( 5.78) 
Base Rate: 16.00 
All Subjects: 19.82 (7.60) 
Analytical Review Signals Error: 20.64 (8.42) 
Analytical Review Signals No Error: 18.84 (6.45) 
Internal Control Weak: 21.83 (8.87) 
Internal Control Strong: 17.89 (5.58) 
Seniors: 19.97 (7.57) 
Managers: 19.65 (7.70) 
An examination of the results concerning the non¬ 
problem accounts shows that for all subjects only the 
internal control variable was significant (P = .010). The 
subjects increased the testing when the internal control 
system was weak (17.89 hours when internal control was strong 
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to 21.83 hours when internal control was weak). 
Interestingly, for managers, the significant effect of 
analytical review (P = .036), caused them to increase testing 
in the non-problem accounts when analytical review signalled 
errors in other accounts. This result is in contrast to 
Biggs et a 1 . (1985) who found that managers only increased 
testing for the actual problem area. However, this effect 
was primarily caused by the case when analytical review 
signalled errors and the internal control system was weak. 
Investigating the individual cells in Figure 4.3, one finds 
that managers allocated 25.55 hours as opposed to seniors who 
allocated 21.50 hours. In the other cells managers only 
allocated between 16.82 hours and 18.46 hours which was close 
to the base rate of 16 hours. 
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Figure 4.4 
Means (Standard Deviations) for Total Hours: 
Problem Accounts 
Seniors 
I ■ C. Me a k_ I.C. Strong 
An . Rev. Signals Error 42.12 (7.85) 43.13 (12.43) 42.66 
(10.38) 
An. Re v. Signals No Error 41.75 (8.60) 31.60 ( 5.95) 37.14 
( 8.98) 
41 . 94 (8.05) 38. 52 (11.69) 
Managers 
I.C, Weak I.C. Strong 
An. Rev. Signals Er ror 44.00 (8.61) | 39.92 (7.15) 41 . 79 
(7.95) 
An. Rev. Signals No Error 36.96 (8.20) 
1 
36.96 (9.25) 36.96 
(8.53) 
40.48 (8.96) 38.56 (8.14) 
Base Rate: 31.00 
All Subjects: 39.87 (9.32) 
Analytical Review Signals Error: 42.26 (9.26) 
Analytical Review Signals No Error: 37.05 (8.66) 
Internal Control Weak: 41.26 (8.43) 
Internal control Strong: 38.54 (10.00) 
Seniors: 40.23 (10.08) 
Managers: 39.48 (8.50) 
For the problem accounts, the analytical review 
manipulation was significant (P = .003), the three-way 
interaction was significant (P = .039), and the internal 
control effect was marginally significant (P = .074). 
Although the main effect for experience was not significant, 
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Table 4.3 
Analysis of Variance for Total Hours: 
Non-Problem and Problem Accounts 
All subjects Seniors Managers 
Source of Variation F _P_ _F_ _P _F_ __P 
Non-Problem Accounts 
Main Effects 
Analytical Review (AR) 2.09 . 1 52 0.01 .919 4.71 .036 
Internal Control (IC) 6.98 .010 3.22 .079 3.81 . 058 
Experience (EXP) 0.03 .867 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
2-Way Interactions 
AR x IC 0.62 .434 0.07 . 793 1.95 .170 
AR x EXP 2. 53 .115 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
IC x EXP 0.01 . 931 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A 
3-Way Interaction 
AR x IC x EXP 1 . 35 .248 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
Problem Accounts 
Main Effects 
Analytical Review (AR) 9.03 .003 4.94 .031 4.18 . 047 
Internal Control (IC) 3.28 .074 2.91 .095 0.69 .410 
Experience (EXP) 0.01 .917 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
2-Way Interactions 
AR x IC 0.95 . 334 4.35 .043 0.69 . 410 
AR x EXP 0.07 . 797 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
IC x EXP 0.48 .490 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
3-Way Interaction 
AR x IC x EXP 4.37 .039 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
an examination of the cell means i n Figure 4.4 i ndicates that 
the previously mentioned pattern for differences between 
managers and seniors is evident. For the managers 
only, the testing is about the same, except when internal 
control is weak and the analytical review results are 
signalling problems (44.00 hours versus 36.96 to 39.92 hours 
for the other cells). While looking at only seniors, the 
hours assigned are approximately the same, except when 
internal control is strong and the analytical review results 
are signalling no problems (31.60 hours versus 41.75 to 43.13 
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hours for the other cells). 
The implication from the analyses conducted separately 
for the non-problem and problem accounts is that the changes 
to the audit plan for the problem accounts occurred primarily 
because of the analytical review results (P = .003 for all 
subjects). In contrast, the changes to the non-problem 
accounts were caused by the perceived strength of the 
internal control system (P = .010 for all subjects). 
Furthermore, the significance of the analytical review 
results for managers in the non-problem accounts (P = .036) 
was a function of changes made in only one cell. In the case 
where the analytical review results signalled problems in 
other account balances and the internal control system was 
weak the managers allocated 25.55 hours (base rate of 16 
hours). Hence, the statistical results reported for the 
hours of the total audit plan are primarily caused by the 
analytical review results for the problem accounts and the 
strength of the internal control system for the non-problem 
accounts. 
Summary of Results for the Variable Total Hours 
The analysis performed on the variable total hours 
indicates a general tendency for auditors to use analytical 
review results to extend testing to a significantly greater 
degree than they use analytical review to reduce testing. 
For e/ample, subjects who received the analytical review 
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results signalling errors allocated 62.87 hours to tests of 
details, while subjects who received the analytical review 
results signalling no errors allocated 55.90 hours. Subjects 
were able to discriminate in a between-subjects design the 
varying reliabilities of the internal control system and 
adjust the audit plan accordingly. The effect of internal 
control is to extent testing when it is weaker. Across all 
subjects, when the case presented a description of a weak 
internal control, a mean of 63.09 hours were allocated. This 
is in contrast to a mean of 56.43 hours when subjects 
received a description of a strong internal control system. 
Although the main effect for experience was not 
significant, an examination of the individual cells suggests 
that this was caused because of conflicting interactions 
between analytical review results and internal control 
reliability. For example, in cases where the internal 
control system was strong, the managers allocated a mean of 
56.33 hours and seniors allocated a mean of 56.50 hours. 
However, breaking this down by individual cells, when a 
strong internal control system is combined with the 
analytical review results signallign errors the managers 
allocated a mean of 58.39 hours and the seniors assigned a 
mean 61.27 hours. This difference was cancelled out by the 
cells of strong internal control and the analytical review 
results signalling no problems (53.91 hours for managers and 
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49.35 hours for seniors). Furthermore, examining only 
seniors the modifications to hours of testing appears to be 
approximately the same except when both analytical review and 
internal control are strong. On the other hand, managers 
tend to make approximately the same changes except when both 
1 
analytical review and internal control are weak. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The test of the hypotheses involved an examination of 
the difference in means across cells for audit hours 
allocated to tests of details. 
HI: HI tests for an effect in the utilization of 
analytical review results. The null hypothesis of no effect 
is rejected for audit hours (P = .005) Subjects are using 
analytical review to a significantly greater extent when 
the analytical review results signal errors than when it is 
1 An analysis was also conducted on the absolute change in 
hours made to the total audit. The variable is defined as 
the change in hours from the base rate of 47 hours. For 
example, if two subjects allocated 37 and 57 hours 
respectively, the absolute change in hours for both subjects 
would be ten hours. This variable was intended to allow an 
additional test for the conservatism tendency by examining 
if the maqnitude of modifications, in either an increasing 
or a decreasing fashion, is influenced by the independent 
variables. However, since there were subjects who increased 
and decreased testing in almost every cell, this variable 
contained too much noise to be utilized as a main variable. 
The results from the ANOVA performed on the absolute change 
in hours did corroborate the findings from the total hours 
variable with significant effects found for analytical review 
(P = .041), internal control (P = .041), and the three-way 
interaction (P = .033). 
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not signalling errors. 
In addition, the subjects appear to be conservative in 
their utilzation of analytical review results. Over 80% of 
the subjects increased the testing above the base rate of 47 
hours. Of the 44 subjects who received the analytical review 
results signalling no errors only 11 (25%) reduced the 
testing below the base rate. This suggests that auditors 
will primarily use the analytical review results to extend 
testing, but will be reluctant to use it to reduce the extent 
of testing. 
H2: The test of H2 is whether internal control 
reliability will affect the extent of audit work. The null 
hypothesis of no effect is rejected for audit hours (P = 
.008). Subjects are attending to, in a between-subjects 
design, the reliability of the internal control system when 
making modifications to planned audit hours. 
H3: Whether experience had an impact on modifications to 
planned audit hours is the focus of H3. The null hypothesis 
of no effect is not rejected. However, as discussed in the 
summary of results, the finding of no main effect for 
experience was caused by conflicting interactions between 
analytical review and internal control reliability. 
H4 - H6: The question of whether there are any 
significant two-way interaction effects, is examined in the 
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tests for H4, H5, and H6. For all three hypotheses, the null 
hypothesis of no effect can not be rejected. This is 
partially attributable to the counteracting trends of the 
individual cells. 
H7: H7 examines if there is a significant three-way 
interaction between analytical review results, internal 
control reliability, and experience. As hypothesized, the 
null hypothesis of no effect can be rejected for total hours 
(P = .038). Managers and seniors differed in the manner 
which they modified the planned tests of details in light of 
the analytical review results and the internal control 
reliability. 
Analysis for the Modifications Rendered to the 
Number of Audit Tests 
An additional set of analyses was performed on the 
number of tests in which the extent of testing either 
increased or decreased. They also examine the modifications 
in testing in a weighted average form. Since the examination 
of the number of tests modified is designed to supplement the 
analysis conducted on the variables concerning hours, only 
modifications rendered to the total audit plan will be 
presented. 
The analyses investigating the number of tests modified, 
were conducted for two reasons. First, a previous study in 
the area of analytical review judgments used the number of 
tests modified as one of their primary independent variables 
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(Blocher et al., 1983). By examining the number of tests 
modified, a better comparison between the results of this 
study and the Blocher et al. study can be made. In addition, 
from a methodological point of view, it would be interesting 
to ascertain how the results derived from analyzing the 
number of hours allocated, converges with the analysis 
performed on the number of tests modified. 
Analysis for the Net Number of Tests Modified 
To determine the direction in which testing was 
modified, an analysis was performed on the net number of 
tests modified. The net number was calculated by subtracting 
out the number of tests in which the extent of testing was 
decreased from the number of tests in which the extent of 
testing was increased. For example, if a subject increased 
three tests and decreased two tests, the net number of tests 
modified is +1. Figure 4.5 reports the means (standard 
deviations) for the net number of tests modified. The ANOVA 
performed is found in Table 4.4. 
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Figure 4.5 
Means (Standard Deviations) for the Net Difference in 
Number of Tests Modified: Total Audit 
Sern ors^ 
I.C. Weak I.C. Strong 
An. Re v. Signals Er ror 2. 92 (3.88) 2.33 (4.45) 2.61 (4.13) 
An. Rev. Signals No Error . 4. 58 (3. 50) 1.00 (4.30) 2.96 (4.20) 
3.72 (3.73) 1.80 (4.35) 
Managers 
LC, Weak I. C. Strong 
An. Re v. Signals Error 4.64 (3.23) 2. 31 (2.90) j 
{ 
3.38 (3.21) 
An. Re v. Signals No Error 1.46 (3.14) 1.64 (4.95) ■ 
i 
1 . 55 (4.04) 
3.05 (3.51 ) 2.00 (3.89) 
Base Rate: 12.00 
All Subjects: 2.64 (3.91) 
Analytical Review Signals Error: 2.96 (3.72) 
Analytical Review Signals No Error: 2.25 (4.14) 
Internal Control Weak: 3.42 (3.57) 
Internal Control Strong: 1.85 (4.12) 
Seniors: 2.76 (4.12) 
Managers: 2.50 (3.71) 
Table 4.4 
Analysis of Variance for Net Number of Tests Modified: 
Total Audit 
Source of Variation 
Main Effects 
Analytical Review (A R) 
Internal Control (IC) 
Experience (EXP) 
2- Way Interacitons 
AR x IC 
AR x EXP 
IC x EXP 
3- Way Interaction 
AR x IC x. EXP 
All JjL u b j e c t s Seniors Managers 
_ r P _F P F P 
1.25 .266 0.02 .889 3.28 .077 
4.55 .036 3.23 .079 1.47 .232 
0.07 . 795 N. A. N. A. N. A. N.A. 
0.09 . 770 1.66 .204 0.93 . 341 
1.75 .189 N. A. N. A. N.A. N.A. 
0.25 .620 N. A. N. A. N. A. N.A. 
2.54 .115 M.A. N. A. N.A. N.A. 
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Internal control was the only variable which had a 
significant effect (P = .036) for the overall analysis. A 
weak internal control had the impact of increasing the net 
number of tests modified. This effect was more pronounced 
for seniors (P = .079) than for managers (P = .232). 
However, for managers, analytical review had a 
marginally significant effect (P = .077). When analytical 
review signalled problems, the net number of tests modified 
increased. Similar to what was found with the variables 
total hours, the managers tend to generate similar increases 
in net number of tests modified except when both analytical 
review and internal control indicate problems (4.64 net tests 
modified versus 2.31 net tests modified for the next largest 
cell ). 
Unlike the findings from the variable total hours, 
the overall effects for analytical review and the three-way 
interaction were not significant. One explanation for this 
lack of convergence of results is that the variable net 
number of tests modified is ignoring the size of the 
modifications. This possible weakness, will be addressed by 
the next set of tests. 
Net Weighted Average Number of Tests Modifier I 
A problem with the preceding analysis is that all 
changes to tests are given equal weight. This set of 
analysis will discriminate between the magnitude of the 
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changes by examining the weighted average number of tests 
modified. 
To determine the direction in which the weighted average 
number of test was modified, an analysis was performed on the 
net weighted average number of tests modified. The variable 
is calculated by subtracting the weighted average number of 
tests decreased from the weighted average number of tests 
increased. Figure 4.6 reports the means (standard 
deviations) for the net weighted average number of tests 
modified. The statistical analysis is presented in Table 4.5. 
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Figure 4.6 
Means (Standard Deviations) for Net Weighted Average 
Number of Tests Modified 
Seniors 
I. C. Weak I. c. Strong 
An. Re v. Signals Error 5. 54 (6. 52) 4.42 (4.93) 4. 94 (5.64) 
An. Re v. Signals N o E rr or 6.62 (5.32) 2.24 (4.59) | 4.63 (5.37) 
6.06 (5.88) 3.55 (4.83) 
Managers 
I.C. Weak I. C. Strong 
An. Rev. Signals Error 9.11 (8.29) 3.45 (2.59): 6.04 (6.45) 
An. Re v. Signals No Error 3.28 ( 3.05) 2.12 (5.13) 2.70 (4.16) 
6.19 (6.79) 2.84 (3.92) 
Base Rate: 12.00 
All Subjects: 4.63 (5.54) 
Analytical Review Signals Error: 5.45 (6.00) 
Analytical Review Signals No Error: 3.67 (4.85) 
Internal Control Weak: 6.06 (6.20) 
Internal Control Strong: 3.20 (4.42) 
Seniors: 4.80 (5.47) 
Managers: 4.44 (5.68) 
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Table 4.5 
Analysis of Variance for Net Weighted Average 
Number of Tests Modified: Total Audit 
. All Subjects Seniors Managers 
Source of Variation F P F P F P 
Main Effects 
Analytical Review (AR) 3.68 .058 0.12 . 726 5.65 .022 
Internal Control (IC) 8.12 .005 3. 15 . 083 5. 14 . 029 
Experience (EXP) 0.05 .824 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
2-Way Interactions 
AR x IC 0.07 . 801 1.11 . 297 2.04 .161 
AR x EXP 2.01 .160 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
IC X EXP 0.11 . 743 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
3-Wav Interaction 
AR x IC x EXP 3.07 . 083 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
For the overall analysis, internal control was 
significant (P = .005). The internal control effect was to 
increase the weighted average number of tests modified when 
the internal control system was weak ( 6.06 versus 3.20 when 
the internal control system was strong). Analytical review 
(P = .058) and the three-way interaction (P = .083) were 
marginally significant. The effect for analytical review 
indicates that subjects made significantly greater increases 
when analytical review signalled problems. An examination of 
the results in Table 4.5 for seniors and managers discloses 
that, for seniors, internal control was marginally 
significant (P = .083), and, for managers, analytical 
review (P = .022) and internal control (P —.029) were 
significant. 
Comparing the results from this variable, with the 
analyses conducted on total hours, there seems to be a 
moderate degree of convergence. For example, the effect of 
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analytical review to increase the net weighted average number 
of tests modified when the analytical review results signal 
potential problems is similar to the effect of increased 
hours found with the total hours. Of the two variables 
analyzed in conjunction with the number of tests modified, 
the net weighted average appears to best capture subjects' 
judgments. This is because the variable takes into account 
both the magnitude and the direction of the tests modified. 
Summary of Results for the Variables Net Number and Net 
Weighted Average Number of Tests Modified 
The analysis performed on the net number and net 
weighted average number of tests modified tends to support 
the contention that analytical review results are utilized to 
a greater degree to extend testing than they are used to 
reduce testing. Furthermore, internal control will influence 
auditors to expand testing when it is weaker. Although the 
main effect for experience was not significant, an 
examination of the individual cells suggests that seniors and 
managers are modifying the audit testing differently. 
Similar to the results found when analyzing modifications 
made to the hours of the audit plan, the seniors expand the 
testing approximately the same except when analytical review 
results signal no problems and the internal control system is 
strong. On the other hand, the changes managers are 
implementing are only significantly different when the 
analytical review results project potential problems and the 
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internal control system is weak. 
A problem with relying upon the analysis concerning the 
net number and net weighted average number of tests modified 
is that it is the total hours of the audit and not the number 
of tests which ultimately determines the cost of the audit. 
Therefore, this analysis was designed to supplement and 
corroborate the analysis performed upon the modifications 
1 
made to the hours of the audit. 
From a methodological point of view, it appears that if 
a researcher is analyzing the modifications in tests, the 
best variable to utilize is the net weighted average number 
of tests modified. This variable at least partially captures 
the magnitude and direction in which changes in audit testing 
are being implemented. In this study, the net weighted 
average variable demonstrated moderate convergence with the 
results found with the variable total hours. For example, 
examining the ANOVA conducted on all subjects the net 
weighted average variable had significant effects for 
internal control (P = .005) and marginal effects for 
analytical review and the three-way interaction (P = .058 and 
P = .083 respectively). This compares with significant 
1 The analysis was also performed separately for the non¬ 
problem and problem accounts. Although more tests were 
modified for the problem accounts (over all subjects, a 
mean of 3.90 out of a base of six tests), a large number 
of non-problem acocunts were also modified (a mean of 
3.19 tests out of a base of six.) 
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effects found in the ANOVA conducted on total hours for 
analytical review (P = .005), internal control (P = .008), 
and the three-way interaction (P = .038). 
Analysis for the Effect of Regression Analysis on the 
Hours Allocated to Audit Testing 
Hypothesis 8 is interested in the effect of the 
perceived importance of regression analysis on the extent 
of audit testing. It was hypothesized that subjects who 
placed greater emphasis on the regression analysis results 
would allocate less hours to tests of details than those 
subjects who placed less emphasis on the regression analysis 
results. To test this hypothesis, subjects were divided into 
two groups based upon their evaluation on a seven-point scale 
of the importance regression analysis data had upon their 
evaluation of the sample audit plan. The seven-point scale 
was anchored by (1) "Extremely Unimportant" and (7) 
"Extremely Important". Subjects with responses below the 
median response (4) were assigned to group 1 and those 
subjects with responses above the median were assigned 
to group 2. 
Table 4.6 reports the results of T-tests conducted on 
the hours allocated to tests of details for all subjects and 
for the two levels of each of the independent variables. 
Although none of the results are significant at the .05 
level, in every instance group 2, which perceived regression 
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analysis to be more important, assigned less hours for audit 
testing that those subjects who perceived regression analysis 
to be less important. The magnitude of the difference is 
much more pronounced for managers (54.38 hours versus 61.17 
hours with P = .053) than for seniors (59.79 hours versus 
59.98 hours with P = .484). This difference is probably 
attributable in part to the greater degree of experience 
managers have in using regression analysis as an analytical 
review procedure (see Table 3.2 for the differences in 
experience between the managers and seniors). Overall, the 
results suggest that to be more efficient in their auditing, 
firms could place greater emphasis on the application of 
regression analysis as a viable substantive test. 
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Table 4.6 
Summary of T-tests on the Effect of Perceived Importance 
of Regression Analysis on the Total Hours Allocated 
Subjects N . of Cases Mean Std. Dev. T-v a 1u e P 
All GRP1-46 60.58 15.15 1.01 .158 
GRP2-29 57.55 10.72 
Seniors GR PI-23 
GRP2-17 
59.98 
59.79 
16.51 
11.04 
0.04 . 484 
Managers GRP1-23 
GRP2-12 
61.17 
54.38 
14.00 
9.82 
1 . 67 .053 
An.Rev. 
Error 
GR P1-24 
GRP2-17 
65.08 
59.21 
16.93 
8. 54 
1 . 46 .077 
An. Rev. 
No Error 
GR P1-22 
GRP2-12 
55.66 
55.21 
11.37 
13.28 
0.10 .461 
I.C. Weak GR P1-22 
GRP2-17 
63.39 
59.68 
16.57 
11.27 
0.83 . 206 
I.C. Strong GR P1-24 
GPR2-12 
58.00 
54. 54 
13.55 
9. 54 
0.89 .192 
Note: Because of the the large differences in sample size 
and variances between groups, all T-tests were conducted 
assuming a separate variance estimate. All significance 
levels are presented for a one-tailed test. 
Analysis of the Effect of Perceived Strength of 
Analytical Review as a Substantive Test 
A similar analysis, as that conducted on the regression 
analysis data, was performed on subjects' evaluations of the 
strength of analytical review procedures as a substantive 
test. The seven-point scale was anchored by (1) "Extremely 
Weak" and (7) "Extremely Strong". The subjects were divided 
by the median response (5) into high and low strength groups. 
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The hypothesis of interest, H9, focused on whether 
subjects who perceived the analytical review procedures to be 
a stronger substantive test would modify tests of details to 
a greater extent, than subjects who perceived the analytical 
review procedures to be a weaker substantive test. Table 4.7 
reports the results of T-tests conducted on the hours 
allocated to tests of details for all subjects and of the two 
levels of each of the independent variables. The results were 
insignificant with the highest level of significance achieved 
being only .325 (for internal control being strong;. No 
discernible effect emerged on the total hours from the 
evaluation by subjects of the strength of analytical review 
as a substantive test. Hence, there appears to be a 
discrepancy between the perception of the strength of 
analytical review procedures as a substantive test, and the 
extent to which auditors will rely upon their results to 
modify tests of details. 
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Table 4.7 
Summary of T-tests on the Effect of Perceived Strength 
_of Analytical Review Tests on the Total Hours A1located 
Subjects N. of Cases Mean Std. Dev. T-va1ue P 
All GRP 1-24 
GRP2-43 
61 . 46 
60.43 
12.40 
16.08 
0.29 .772 
Seniors GRP 1 -14 
GRP2-18 
60.96 
60.94 
11.65 
18.35 
0.00 .997 
Managers GRP1-10 
GRP2-25 
62.15 
60.06 
14.00 
14.62 
0. 39 . 698 
An. Rev. 
E rr or GRP1-14 
GRP2-24 
64.79 
65.00 
11.68 
16.97 
-0.05 . 964 
An. Rev. 
No Error GRP1-10 
GRP2-19 
56.80 
54. 66 
12.44 
13.13 
0. 43 .670 
I.C. Weak GRP 1-9 
GRP2-25 
65.28 
64.60 
1 5. 54 
15.26 
0. 11 . 91 2 
I.C. 
Strong GRP1-15 
GRP2-18 
59. 17 
54.64 
9.98 
15. 78 
1 . 00 . 325 
Note: Because of the large differences in sample size and 
variances between groups, all T-tests were conducted assuming 
a separate variance estimate. Since it was hypothesized that 
there would be no differences between the groups, all 
significance levels are presented for a two-tailed test. 
Additional Analysis 
Statistical analysis was conducted to see if any of the 
cells differed in the time it took to complete the task and 
the degree to which subjects found the task and materials in 
the study to be interesting. In both cases, the results from 
ANOVA found no significant differences between the cells (P = 
.335 for minutes and P = .595 for the degree to which the 
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task was perceived to be interesting). This indicates that 
differences in the extent of audit planning across the cells 
was not caused by either the amount of time it took to 
complete the task or the degree to which subjects found the 
task to be interesting. 
Another question of interest was whether subjects would 
differ in the importance they placed on different types of 
information. Subjects were asked to evaluate on a seven- 
point scale the importance of industry data, financial 
ratios, financial statement trends, and the description of 
the internal control system. For all four types of 
information, the ANOVA found no significant differences 
across the cells (P = .788 for industry data, P = .449 for 
financial ratios, P = .935 for financial statement trends, 
and P = .623 for the description of the internal control 
system). Apparently, the perceived importance of various 
types of information did not cause the differences between 
the cells in the allocation of audit hours. 
CHAPTER V 
Conclusions 
This chapter will first summarize the results of the 
study and compare the findings to those disclosed in other 
studies in the area of analytical review. Next, the 
implications of the findings for the accounting profession 
and accounting research will be discussed. An assessment of 
the limitations of the study will then be presented. The 
final section will examine possible future research to 
evaluate analytical review based judgments. 
Summary and Findings of the Study 
The primary objective of this study was to examine 
whether a conservatism tendency will predispose auditors to 
utilize the results from analytical review procedures to only 
extend, but not reduce, the planned tests of details. The 
study also assesses the extent to which analytical review 
based judgments are affected by internal control reliability, 
experience, and the type of information used. This is tested 
by examining subjects' responses in a case study depicting 
the sales and collection cycle of an audit. Ninety-six 
auditors, representing eight national public accounting firms 
from offices in Boston, New York, and Hartford, took part in 
the study. 
The results of the analytical review procedures, 
internal control reliability and experience were each 
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no 
manipulated to have two levels. For the purpose of the 
study, each factor is considered orthogonal resulting in a 
between-subjects 2x2x2 fixed effects model. 
The analysis focused on subjects' modifications made to 
planned tests of details for the sales and collection cycle. 
Total hours is the main dependent variable because ultimately 
it is the number of hours of audit work which primarily 
determines the cost and relative efficiency of an audit. 
Supplementary analysis was also conducted on the number of 
tests of details modified. 
It was hypothesized that the results of analytical 
review procedures, the reliability of internal control, and 
experience would influence subjects' decisions to modify 
planned tests of details. The results for total hours 
revealed significant main effects for analytical review (P = 
.005), internal control reliability (P = .008), and a three- 
way interaction (P = .038). 
The major finding of the study is that there is a 
conservatism tendency among auditors in their use of 
analytical review results. Auditors utilized analytical 
review results when it signalled possible errors to extend 
planned tests of details. However, when the analytical 
review results signalled that the account balances were in 
order, the auditors did not reduce the planned testing. For 
example, in the best case scenario of analytical review 
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results signalling no errors and a strong internal control 
system, the mean hours allocated were 49.35 for seniors and 
53.91 for managers (base rate of 47 hours). 
Another important finding of the study is that, in a 
between-subjects design, auditors were able to discriminate 
between the varying reliabilities of the internal control 
system and adjust the audit plan accordingly. The mean total 
hours allocated was 63.09 hours for a weak internal control 
system, and 56.43 hours for a strong internal control system. 
Experience, operationalized as either seniors or 
managers, and all two-way interactions did not have 
significant effects. However, the main effect for experience 
was not significant because of conflicting interactions 
between the individual cells. For example, although seniors 
and managers allocated approximately the same hours when the 
internal control was strong (56.50 and 56.33 respectively) 
the individual cells had different patterns. In the case of 
an interaction with the analytical review results signalling 
errors, the seniors allocated more hours (61.27 versus 58.39 
for managers). The magnitude of the difference was cancelled 
out when the analytical review results signalled no errors 
(53.91 hours for managers and 49.35 hours for seniors). 
Another interesting difference to emerge when examining 
the individual cells is that for seniors only, the same 
changes to the audit plan were implemented in all cases 
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except when the results of the analytical review procedures 
signalled no errors and the internal control system was 
strong (49.35 total hours allocated to tests of details 
versus a range of 61.27 to 64.13 total hours allocated for 
the other cells of the seniors). On the other hand, managers 
kept the same changes to the audit plan in all cases except 
when the results of the analytical review procedures 
signalled errors and the internal control system was weak 
(69.55 total hours allocated versus a range of 53.91 to 58.39 
total hours allocated for the other three cells). 
The results of the ANOVA conducted separately for 
seniors and managers also revealed some interesting 
differences. For seniors, only internal control was 
significant (P < .05), while for managers the analytical 
review manipulation emerged as the most significant variable 
(P < .05). The differences between managers and seniors will 
be discussed further in the chapter when comparing the 
results of this study with previous studies. 
Subjects were also asked to indicate how important the 
regression analysis data was in their evaluation of the 
sample audit plan. In addition, they were asked to assess 
the strength of analytical review as substantive tests. 
Dividing subjects into two groups (either above or below the 
median response), T-tests were conducted on both questions to 
determine if there were any effects on the dependent 
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variable, total hours. No significant effects were found. 
However, for all tests (for all subjects and for each of the 
two levels of the independent variables) those who ranked 
regression analysis as more important in their evaluation of 
the sample audit plan, assigned less hours to the audit plan 
It would be interesting to examine in a further study if 
relying more on regression analysis data will result in a 
more efficient and less costly audit. 
It is interesting that the perceived strength of 
analytical review procedures as a substantive test had no 
impact on the modifications made to the planned tests of 
details. Hence, there appears to be a discrepancy between 
the perception of the strength of analytical review 
procedures and the use of analytical review results. One 
explanation could be that to understand and predict an 
auditor's use of analytical review procedures, one must 
gather data on an auditor's attitude towards possible 
outcomes associated with utilizing analytical review results 
This issue will be discussed further in conjuction with 
possible future studies. 
Comparing the results of this study to those of Biggs 
et al. (1985), the effect of analytical review on the audit 
work is quite similar. Biggs et al. also observed, in an in 
depth protocol analysis of four auditors, that the results 
from analytical review procedures influences auditors to 
114 
extend audit testing when it signals problems but not to 
reduce audit testing when it signals no problems. This 
conservatism tendency found in a protocol analysis of four 
auditors from a single firm was corroborated in this study on 
a larger sample of ninety-six auditors across eight firms. 
Biggs et a 1. also found a difference in the decisions of 
seniors and managers which they attribute to the superior 
ability of managers to identify the subtle and complex 
relationships between analytical review evidence and audit 
program changes. In this study, since there was no 
unambiguous criterion variable, it is less evident whether 
the judgments of the managers were superior to the judgments 
of the seniors. It is interesting though, that one of the 
differences that emerged between the seniors and managers is 
that the results of analytical review procedures was the most 
significant variable for the managers, while the reliability 
of internal control was the most significant variable for the 
seniors. One possible explanation for this outcome could be 
that managers simply have more experience in using analytical 
review procedures. On the other hand, the literature on 
internal control evaluations has demonstrated no significant 
effects for experience (e.g., Ashton, 19/4; Ashton and Brown, 
1930; and Hamilton and Wright, 1982). Hence, since seniors 
are competent in internal control evaluations, they might be 
predisposed to rely more on the internal control information 
lib 
than on the less familiar and more complex results emanating 
from analytical review testing. 
Wright and Mock (1986), in a study of evidential 
planning decisions for an audit of the inventory account, 
found that although auditors had high consensus on the 
attributes they were seeking in audit evidence, they had low 
consensus in applying audit hours for testing. Furthermore, 
auditors disproportion ate1y allocated audit hours to tests of 
details as opposed to analytical review procedures and 
physical observation. This outcome occurred even though the 
auditors did not agree in their evaluations of which audit 
procedures were superior in the attributes considered 
important for audit evidence. One explanation for their 
results could be the conservatism bias revealed in this study 
that auditors generally utilize the results of analytical 
review procedures to extend the tests of details but rarely 
to reduce them. 
The results of this study and the studies of Biggs et 
a 1 . (1985) and Wright and Mock (1986) tend to support the 
idea that auditors are not utilizing analytical review to its 
fullest potential. Apparently, auditors are effectively 
using analytical review as a red flag to highlight areas of 
potential problems where more work is needed. However, they 
appear reluctant to use analytical review procedures to 
reduce the tests of details. This transpires even if, as in 
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the Wright and Mock study, auditors don't consider tests of 
details to be superior to analytical review procedures in the 
attributes they consider important for audit evidence. 
The conservatism tendency is in contrast to what is 
suggested by Blocher et al. (1983). Their study, of an audit 
of the payroll expense account, found that auditors are 
primarily using analytical review results to reduce testing. 
However, their finding is based on the number of audit steps 
reduced. As discussed in this study, it is the number of 
hours of testing, and not the number of tests, which 
ultimately determines the cost of the audit. Furthermore, 
in this study the number of tests modified was examined. The 
results indicate that if one wants to examine the 
modifications in tests, the net weighted average number of 
tests modified is the best dependent variable to use. This 
is because the net weighted average takes into consideration 
both the direction and magnitude of any changes. 
Implications for Accounting 
Given the extremely volatile and competitive market 
conditions facing auditing firms, it will be necessary for 
auditors to exercise greater cost control in the future. 
Analytical review is an officially accepted auditing 
technique (SAS 23, 1978) which could help auditors achieve 
greater efficiency without relinquishing a material amount of 
accuracy. In fact, Hylas and Ashton (1982) suggest that 
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analytical review is highly effective in revealing account 
balance errors. 
The results of this study indicate that auditors are 
conservative in their use of analytical review. An outcome 
of this conservatism tendency is that analytical review will 
be conducive to increasing, and not decreasing, the cost and 
extent of the audit work. Perhaps auditing firms should 
focus increasing attention and resources on educating 
auditors to utilize analytical review not only as a "red 
flag", but also as a substantive test. 
On the other hand, the results of the internal control 
manipulation demonstrate that auditors are evaluating the 
reliability of the information when utilizing analytical 
review procedures. Although the main effect for internal 
control was significant, the two-way interaction between 
analytical review and internal control was not statistically 
significant. However, a comparison of the individual cells 
shows, that for both the case of analytical review signalling 
errors and for the case where it is signalling no errors, a 
weak internal control system resulted in more total hours 
allocated to tests of details. This is in accordance with 
SAS 23 (1978, p. 43) which states when planning and 
performing analytical review procedures, "The auditor should 
consider the possibility that financial or nonfinancial 
information might not be reliable based on his knowledge of 
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the entity, including his knowledge of the means by which the 
information is produced." 
The reason why seniors and managers differed in the 
pattern of interactions of the individual cells is open to 
speculation. One explanation which is suggested by the 
expert decision making literature is that the more 
experienced decision makers (i.e. the managers) are focusing 
in on the most salient pieces of information. The 
significance of the analytical review manipulation for 
managers in the non-problem accounts (P = .036) appears to 
contradict this explanation. However, an examination of the 
hours allocated in each of the cells demonstrates that this 
result was primarily caused by changes made in the case where 
the analytical review results signalled errors in other 
account balances and the internal control was weak (25.55 
hours as compared to a range of 16.82 to 18.46 hours for the 
other three cells and a base rate of 16 hours). Perhaps an 
attempt should be undertaken to model the decision processes 
of auditors to gain a better insight to why the patterns of 
the judgments of seniors and managers are so different. This 
is an issue to be addressed in a future study. 
The results of the study also have implications for 
accounting research. In Chapter I it was hypothesized that 
one reason why some findings in psychology were not 
corroborated when examined in an auditing context was because 
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of a conservatism tendency among auditors (e.g., Joyce and 
Biddle, 1981a; Tomassini, et a!., 1982; and Kida, 1984). 
The results of this study suggest that the judgments of 
auditors will be influenced by a propensity towards 
conservatism. Thus, when accounting researchers are testing 
hypotheses emanating from the psychology discipline, they 
should attempt to either control for conservatism or else 
test for conservatism as a rival hypothesis. 
Limitations of the Study 
Like most experimental research this study has 
limitations. First, although the task was generated with 
assistance from practicing auditors, it still is a simplified 
representation of the auditing process. To gain more 
external validity, it would have been preferable to use 
actual audit workpapers. However, client confidentiality 
precludes their accessibility to most research. 
As mentioned in the design section, a second limitaiton 
of the study might be in interpreting the results from the 
experience variable. The typical approach in 
operationalizing an independent variable is to randomly 
assign subjects to the different levels of the factor. In 
the case of the experience variable this would result in 
randomly assigning subjects to be either a senior or a 
manager. Since this is impossible to accomplish when using 
real auditors as subjects, the effect of the experience 
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variable could be attributable in part to other factors which 
distinguish managers and seniors. A future study could 
address this issue by trying to match up seniors and managers 
on such characteristics as technical ability, education, etc. 
Probably the most important limitation is the 
possibility that the base rate was set too low. If the base 
rate of forty seven hours was too low, then the finding of a 
conservatism tendency in the utilization of analytical review 
results would not be surprising. However, the base rate was 
established from a pre-test. In addition, the fact that 
nineteen subjects across a variety of cells did reduce the 
total hours of testing suggests that the base rate was a 
reasonable starting point. 
Another limitation arises because of the lack of a 
single unambiguous measure of the dependent variable. To 
rectify this limitation, the dependent variable was 
operationalized by a number of different procedures. It is 
hoped that by utilizing a multiple approach, the extent to 
which subjects modified the planned tests of details was 
effectively captured. Furthermore, at least the general 
direction for the results derived from the variable total 
hours was corroborated by the supplementary analysis 
conducted on the netnumber and the net weighted average 
number of tests modified. 
In addition, some experimental control was forfeited 
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because subjects completed the questionnaire without the 
experimenter present. This could result in subjects not 
taking the questionnaire seriously. However, since the mean 
time to complete the task was 42.33 minutes (standard 
deviation of 18.98 minutes), it appears that subjects were at 
least attempting to analyze the materials distributed to them. 
Directions for Future Research 
The finding in this study of a conservatism tendency 
among auditors in their use of analytical review results 
raises the question of what other variables affect the 
reliance upon analytical review procedures. One factor could 
be an auditor's perspective of possible costs that might 
emanate from his decisions. Auditors could be willing to 
incur the extra costs of extensive tests of details for 
lowering their perceived probability that they would miss a 
material misstatement of the financial statements. A future 
study could address this issue by trying to develop an 
auditor's loss function. Perhaps a process tracing technique 
could be utilized to reveal an auditor's decision processes 
as well as his judgments. 
Libby (1985) found that auditors are more likely to 
generate hypotheses for errors that would overstate net 
income and liquidity rather than understate net income and 
liquidity. One explanation for his result is that the 
perceived costs associated with overstating net income and 
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liquidity is greater than the perceived costs of understating 
net income and liquidity. It would be interesting for a 
future study to examine if the type of account balance error 
(e.g., overstatement or understatement of net income and 
liquidity) would affect the use of analytical review 
judgments. It appears likely that for the potentially less 
costly understatement errors, auditors would rely to a 
relativly large degree on analytical review procedures as 
substantive tests. 
The reason why there is a discrepancy between the 
perceived strength of analytical review procedures and the 
utilization of analytical review results could be addressed 
by investigating the impact of attitudes upon analytical 
review based judgments. It's suggested by the attitude 
literature (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1980; Kida, 1980) that an auditor's use and 
reliance upon analytical review as a substantive test will be 
heavily influenced by their attitudes towards possible 
outcomes associated with using it as a test. This would 
involve eliciting possible outcomes associated with using 
analytical review procedures (e.g., the reliance upon 
analytical review as a substantive test will result in 
increased litigation against the auditing firm). It would be 
of interest to determine how the beliefs about the outcomes 
associated with using analytical review procedures will 
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affect an auditor's judgment and consequent behavior 
concerning the extent to which they will rely upon analytical 
review results. 
Finally, an extension could be made to the exploratory 
work in this study concerning the usefulness of regression 
analysis data as an analytical review procedure. Although the 
results were not statistically significant, the direction of 
the data gathered in this study suggests that auditors who 
utilize regression analysis as an analytical review procedure 
may be more efficient in their audit. A possible extension 
to this research would be to investigate the effect of 
providing or not providing the regression analysis data, 
holding all other factors constant. Since the review of the 
literature in Chapter II reveals that regression analysis is 
an effective substantive test (e.g., Albrecht and McKeown, 
1977; Kinney, 1978; Kaplan, 1979; Akresh and Wallace, 1980; 
etc.), it would be interesting to determine if using 
regression analysis will result in less audit work. If so, 
firms could become more cost efficient in their audit without 
adding a material amount of risk to their firm. 
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire for Development of the 
Sample Audit Plan 
Appendix A contains the questionnaire used to develop the 
sample audit plan. All subjects participating in the pretest 
completed the same questionnaire. 
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General Instructions 
Assume you are designing an audit plan for substantive testing to be 
performed on the sales and collection cycle. The client involved is a 
wholesaler of consumer products. It has been a client for several years and 
has typically received an unqualified opinion. This year's sales are 
approximately 13 million dollars and its assets are approximately 7 million 
dollars. This industry is expected to experience growth in the foreseeable 
future. 
Other factors concerning the firm include the following: 
1. The internal control system is considered adequate. It has been 
decided to place a moderate degree of reliance on the internal control system 
when determining the extent and nature of the auditing plan. 
2. The company has its own credit department. 
3. Accounts Receivable represents approximately 15-25% of the firm's 
total assets. 
4. All sales are for credit, with terms, net 30. Seasonality is not 
considered an important factor in sales. 
A summary of the current year unaudited financial statements are 
attached. Based on the above description, and a review of the current year's 
unaudited financial statements, you will be asked to determine the nature and 
extent of substantive tests of details that you would typically use to test 
the following accounts: (a) sales, (b) sales returns and allowances, (c) 
accounts receivable, (d) allowance for doubtful accounts, (e) bad debt 
expense, and (f) cash. Note, we are interested in what you consider to be 
the typical nature and extent of tests for the size and type of firm 
presented here. You are to design the audit plan assuming that no analytical 
review procedures are performed. 
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Tests of details, relevant to testing the account balances of sales, 
sales -returns and allowances, accounts receivable, allowance for doubtful 
accounts, bad debt expense and cash are listed after the financial statement 
data. Please indicate whether you would perform each test and the extent to 
which you would perform the test. Assume that last year it took 
approximately 80 person hours to perform this section of the audit. Your 
current audit plan does not have to equal 80 hours. As stated, design the 
audit plan assuming no analytical review procedures are performed. 
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Balance Sheet Current Year—Unaudited 
Assets $ Amount 
% of Total 
Assets 
Cash 331,440 4.9 
Gross Accounts Receivable 1,190,478 17.6 
Less: Allowance for Doubtful Accts. (101,461) (1.5) 
Net Accounts Receivable 1,089,017 16.1 
Inventory 2,408,012 35.6 
Note Receivable—Current 47,348 0.7 
Other Current Assets 459,957 6.8 
Total Current Assets 4,335,774 64.1 
Property Plant and Equipment 2,332,609 34.5 
Less: Accumulated Depreciation (297,619) (4.4) 
Net Property, Plant and Equipment 2,034,990 30.1 
Intangibles—Net 83,820 1.2 
All Other Non-Current Assets 309,494 4.6 
Total Assets 6,764,078 100.0 
Accounts Payable 2,462,125 36.4 
Current Portion—Long Term Debt 561,418 8.3 
Other Current Liabilities 229,979 3.4 
Total Current Liabilities 3,253,522 48.1 
Long Term Debt 1,496,893 22.1 
Other Non-Current Liabilities 20,292 0.3 
Common Stock 234,750 3.5 
Retained Earnings 1,758,621 26.0 
Total Shareholder's Equity 1,993,371 29.5 
Total Liability and Owner's Equity 6,764,078 100.0 
Income Statement Current Year—Unaudited 
Income $ Amount 
X of Net 
Sales 
Sales 13,854,089 101.9 
(Sales Returns & Allowances) (252,155) (1.9) 
Net Sales 13,601,934 100.0 
(Cost of Sales) (9,087,943) (66.8) 
Gross Profit 4,513,991 33.2 
(Bad Debt Expense) (489,670) (3.6) 
(Other Operating Expenses) (2,990,435) (22.0) 
Operating Income 1,033,886 7.6 
(All Other Expenses—Net) (81,612) (0.6) 
Earnings Before Taxes 952,274 7.0 
(Income Taxes) (285,682) (2.1) 
Net Income 666,592 4.9 
Accounts Receivable Aging Analysis 
Total 0-30 31-60 61-90 Over 
days days days 90 days 
Current Year—Gross Accounts Receivable 1,190,478 440,447 346,429 222,619 180,983 
X of Gross Accounts Receivable 100% 37.0% 29.1% 18.7% 15.2% 
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If there are any other relevant tests of details you might perform to 
test the account balances of sales, sales returns and allowances, accounts 
receivable, allowance or doubtful accounts, bad debt expense, and cash, 
please list them below. In addition, state the extent of testing to be 
planned in approximate hour(s). 
Other Auditing Procedures The Extent of Testing 
Please fill out the following biographical information. This will be used 
for demographic analysis only. 
Firm Name: _____ 
Number of Years of Auditing Experience: _ Years. 
Current Position (e.g., Senior, Manager, etc.): 
Again, thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix B 
thP Internal Control Evaluation 
Questionnaire on the intern 
Appendix B 
reliability 
the questionnaire used to was 
contains tne » tems. Page 14Z w 
of the internal contr part in this pretest. 
PpragSe sni43 and^H^^err presenteeIt. re 
E:nt^rt:n^^:itr^o°^^t:d the stronger internal 
control system. 
142 
General Instructions 
Assume you are a new in-charge accountant on an audit engagement with the primary 
responsibility of the sales and collection cycle. The client is involved in the wholesale 
consumer industry. Your client maintains its own credit department with receivables 
representing approximately 15-25% of the firm's total assets. 
A review of the internal control system relevant to the sales and 
collection cycle has been completed. Based on a description of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the system and the results of the compliance testing, you 
will be asked to respond to the following statement. 
Given the description of the client's sales and collection cycle internal 
control system, and a description of the results of the compliance testing, the 
degree of reliance you would place on the internal control system when designing 
the substantive audit plan for the sales and collection cycle would be 
J_^_1_I_I__L__L 
No —— ‘"Little -Moderate -■ 1 Maximum 
Reliance Reliance Reliance Reliance 
Place an X in the space which best approximates the degree of reliance you 
would place on the client's internal control system. 
That is: 
* 
Not 
This 
This 
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Client's Sales and Collection Cycle Internal Control System 
A. Strengths 
1. Recording of sales is supported by authorized pre-numbered shipping 
documents and approved customer orders. 
2. Sales invoices are pre-numbered and accounted for. 
3. Billing, recording of sales, and deposit of cash receipts are done on 
a daily basis. 
B. Weaknesses 
1. Credit sales are made using customer credit worthiness criteria that 
have remained unchanged for several years. 
2. An up-to-date job description and procedural manual is not in use at 
this time. 
3. The clerk responsible for posting cash receipts and sales to their 
respective journals, also posts transactions to the detailed accounts 
receivable cards. 
C. Results of Compliance Testing 
The compliance testing has found the following controls not to be effective: 
1. The system calls for rotation of jobs between the accounting clerks. 
In practice, there is no rotation of jobs. 
2. The system calls for a separate clerk to review invoices for mathematical 
accuracy, prices used, quantities billed, and credit terms. In practice, 
the clerk responsible for preparing the invoice is usually the only one 
who reviews this information. 
3. The system calls for the controller to approve all sales returns and 
allowances, discounts, and bad debt charge-offs. In practice, the 
salespeople and the marketing department have handled this function. 
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D. Other Information 
1. All other aspects of the internal control system were found by 
compliance testing to be effective. 
2. A management override on these controls seems highly improbable. 
Given the description of the client's sales and collection cycle internal 
control system, and a description of the results of the compliance testing, the 
degree of reliance you would place on the internal control system when designing 
the substantive audit plan for the sales and collection cycle would be: 
No -- Little -_ Moderate  ^-Maximum 
Reliance Reliance Reliance Reliance 
Please fill out the following biographical information. This information 
will be used for demographic analysis only. Thank you again for your generous 
help in this research project. 
Firm Name: _____ 
Number of Years of Auditing Experience: Years 
Current Position (e.g., Senior, Manager, etc.): _ 
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Client"s Sales and Collection Cycle Internal Control System 
A. Strengths 
1. Recording of sales is supported by authorized pre-numbered shipping 
documents and approved customer orders. 
2. Sales invoices are pre-numbered and accounted for. 
3. Billing, recording of sales, and deposit of cash receipts are done on 
a daily basis. 
4. Regular monthly statements are sent to customer and all correspondence 
is sent directly to the president of the company. 
5. Credit sales are made using customer credit worthiness criteria that 
are updated at least once a year. 
6. The clerk responsible for posting cash receipts and sales to their 
respective journals is different than the clerk posting transactions 
to the detailed accounts receivable cards. 
7. The bookkeeper reviews all invoices prepared by the billing clerk for 
mathematical accuracy, prices used, quantities billed and credit terms. 
8. All sales returns and allowances, discounts and bad debt charge offs 
must get the approval of both the credit department and the controller 
of the company. 
B. Results of Compliance Testing 
Compliance testing found the controls of the internal control system to be 
in place and with errors significantly less than the maximum tolerable error 
rate 
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C. Other Information 
1. All other aspects of the internal control system appear adequate. 
2. A management override on these controls seems highly improbable. 
3. The client's staff is competent, well experienced and primarily 
college educated. 
Given the description of the client's sales and collection cycle internal 
control system, and a description of the results of the compliance testing, the 
degree of reliance you would place on the internal control system when designing 
the substantive audit plan for the sales and collection cycle would be: 
No ^ ^_ Little _^ ^_ Moderate _y ^_ Maximum 
Reliance Reliance Reliance Reliance 
Please fill out the following biographical information. This information 
will be used for demographic analysis only. Thank you againn for your generous 
help in this research project. 
Firm Name:_ 
Number of Years of Auditing Experience: _ Years 
Current Position (e.g.. Senior, Manager, etc.):_ 
Appendix C 
Experimental Task and Questionnaire 
Appendix C contains the experimental task and questionnaire. 
General Instructions: A11 Subjects 
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General Instruct ions 
This study is designed to investigate several Issues concerning the audit 
procedures of the sales and collection cycle. The client is a wholesaler of 
consumer products. It has been a client for several years and has typically 
received an unqualified opinion. 
You will be provided with the following information about the client: 
1. A description of the internal control system relevant to the sales and 
collection cycle. 
2. Two years of audited financial statements and this year's unaudited 
financial statements. 
3. Analytical review procedures relevant to the sales and collection 
cycle for the past two years of audited data and this year's unaudited 
data. 
4. The current year and past two years of industry financial data. 
5. Regression analysis based estimates of the sales and collection cycle 
account balances. 
After reviewing the information, you will be asked to determine whether any of 
the following unaudited account balances might need an adjustment: 
1. Sales, 
2. Sales Returns and Allowances, 
3. Bad Debt Expense, 
4. Accounts Receivable, 
5. Allowance for Doubtful Accounts, and 
6. Cash. 
You will then be asked to determine if any modifications are needed to the 
nature and/or extent of the sales and collection cycle portion of the sample audit 
plan. This plan was produced by the research staff of your firm, and is typical for 
firms in your client's industry possessing an adequate internal control system. The 
# 
plan involves tests of details only and does not consider analytical review results. 
Your firm is interested in validating this audit plan by examining its applicability 
to specific clients, taking all relevant information into account. Specific 
instructions for this decision are provided immediately preceding the audit plan. 
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Description of the Weak Internal Control System 
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Cllent^s Sales and Collection Cycle Internal Control System 
A. Strengths 
1. Recording of sales is supported by authorized pre-numbered shipping 
documents and approved customer orders. 
2. Sales Invoices are pre-numbered and accounted for. 
3. Billing, recording of sales, and deposit of cash receipts are done on 
a dally basis. 
B. Weaknesses 
1. Credit sales are made using customer credit worthiness criteria that 
have remained unchanged for several years. 
2. An up-to-date job description and procedural manual is not in use at 
this time. 
3. The clerk responsible for posting cash receipts and sales to their 
respective journals, also posts transactions to the detailed accounts 
receivable cards. 
C. Results of Compliance Testing 
The compliance testing has found the following controls not to be effective: 
1. The system calls for rotation of jobs between the accounting clerks. 
In practice, there is no rotation of jobs. 
2. The system calls for a separate clerk to' review invoices for mathematical 
accuracy, prices used, quantities billed, and credit terms. In practice, 
the clerk responsible for preparing the invoice is usually the only one 
who reviews this Information. 
3. The system calls for the controller to approve all sales returns and 
allowances, discounts, and bad debt charge-offs. In practice, the 
salespeople and the marketing department have handled this function. 
D. Other Information * 
1. All other aspects of the internal control system were found by 
compliance testing to be effective. 
2. A management override on these controls seems highly improbable. 
Description of the Strong Internal Control System 
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Clients Sales and Collection Cycle Internal Control System 
A. Strengths 
1. Recording of sales is supported by authorized pre-numbered shipping 
documents and approved customer orders. 
2. Sales invoices are pre-numbered and accounted for. 
3. Billing, recording of sales, and deposit of cash receipts are done on 
a daily basis. 
4. Regular monthly statements are sent to customers and all correspondence 
is sent directly to the president of the company. 
5. Credit sales are made using customer credit worthiness criteria that 
are updated at least once a year. 
6. The clerk responsible for posting cash receipts and sales to their 
respective journals is different than the clerk posting transactions 
to the detailed accounts receivable cards. 
7. The bookkeeper reviews all invoices prepared by the billing clerk for 
mathematical accuracy, prices used, quantities billed and credit terms. 
8. All sales returns and allowances, discounts and bad debt charge offs 
must get the approval of both the credit department and the controller 
of the company. 
B. Results of Compliance Testing 
Compliance testing found the controls of the internal control system to be 
in place and with errors significantly less than the maximum tolerable error 
rate. 
C. Other Information 
1. All other aspects of the internal control system appear adequate. 
2. A management override on these controls seems highly improbable. 
3. The client's staff is competent, well experienced and primarily 
college educated 
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Financial Statement DATA and Analytical 
Signalling Errors 
Review Procedures 
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Quantitative Data 
The following estimates of account balances were generated through 
regression analysis. It is based on the past four years of quarterly audited 
data. Gross profit was utilized to derive the prediction for the sales account, 
and sales was employed to predict the following account balances: 
Sales Returns and Allowances, 
Accounts Receivable, 
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts, 
Bad Debt Expense, and 
Cash. 
In addition to the predicted account balance, each account will have a 
standard error of the estimate. This will give some indication of the 
variability of the data used to generate the predicted account balances. 
Accounts 
Predicted 
Account Balances 
Standard Error 
of the Estimate 
Gross Sales 
Sales Returns and 
13,835,000 691,750 
Allowances 248,000 12,400 
Gross Accounts Receivable 
Allowance for Doubtful 
1,184,000 59,200 
Accounts 103,400 5,170 
Bad Debt Expense 474,674 23,734 
Cash 345,115 17,256 
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Quantitative Data 
The following estimates of account balances were generated through 
regression analysis. It is based on the past four years of quarterly audited 
data. Gross profit was utilized to derive the prediction for the sales account, 
and sales was employed to predict the following account balances: 
Sales Returns and Allowances, 
Accounts Receivable, 
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts, 
Bad Debt Expense, and 
Cash. 
In addition to the predicted account balance, each account will have a 
standard error of the estimate. This will give some indication of the 
variability of the data used to generate the predicted account balances. 
Accounts 
Predicted 
Account Balances 
Standard Error 
of the Estimate 
Gross Sales 
Sales Returns and 
13,835,000 691,750 
Allowances 248,000 12,400 
Gross Accounts Receivable 
Allowance for Doubtful 
1,184,000 59,200 
Accounts 103,400 5,170 
Bad Debt Expense 474,674 23,734 
Cash ?45,115 17,256 
166 
Evaluation of Unaudited Account Balances 
Audit Plan: All Subjects 
and Sample 
167 
Based on the preceding information, please determine whether any of the 
following sales and collection cycle current year's unaudited account balances 
may need an adjustment. Please place a check mark next to "Yes" if you think 
an account may need an adjustment, and next to "No" if you think the account does 
not need an adjustment. 
Accounts 
Will the Account Possibly 
Need an Adjustment? 
Sales Yes 
No 
Sales Returns and Allowances Yes 
No 
Bad Debt Expense Yes 
No 
Accounts Receivable Yes 
No 
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts Yes 
No 
Cash Yes 
No 
Your firm has developed a typical audit plan for a firm in this industry 
possessing an adequate internal control system. The plan involves tests of 
details only and does not consider analytical review results. Based on the 
preceding information, please determine if the nature and/or extent of this 
typical audit plan will require any modifications. 
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172 
If there are any other relevant tests of details you might 
performto test the account balances of sales, sales returns and 
allowances, accounts receivable, allowance for doubtful accounts, bad 
debt expense, and cash, please list them below. In addition, state 
the extent of testing to be planned in approximate hour(s). 
Other Auditing Procedures The Extent of Testing 
173 
Evaluative and Demographic Questions: All Subjects 
174 
Evaluative and Demographic Questionnaire 
l'lease respond to the following evaluative and demographic questions, 
information will be used for research analysis only. 
Place an "X" In the space (not on the line) which best indicates your 
about the statement. 
That is: 
i i x i i 1 l K I 
This Not 
This 
The closer you place an "X" to the end points indicates 
stronger agreement with the phrase at that end of the scale. 
Industry data was: 
1 1 1 '1 1 1 1 . 1 
Extremely 
Unimportant 
in my evaluation of the sample audit plan. 
Extremely 
Important 
The client's financial 
1_1_L 
ratios were: 
i 1 
Extremely Extremely 
Unimportant Important 
in my evaluation of the sample audit plan. 
3. The client's financial statement trends were: 
i I I I l l I J 
Extremely Extremely 
Unimportant Important 
in my evaluation of the sample audit plan. 
4. The description of the client's internal control 
i i i i i I 
system was: 
l J 
Extremely Extremely 
Unimportant Important 
in my evaluation of the sample audit plan. 
3. The regression analysis estimates of the account 
.iiiiii 
balances were : 
I J 
Extremely Extremely 
Unimportant Important 
* in my evaluation of the sample audit plan. 
This 
belief 
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6. Analytical review procedures are: 
Extremely Extremely 
Weak Strong 
substantive tests. 
7. In direct testing of account balances, the degree of reliance I'd place 
on analytical review results is: 
Minimum Maximum 
Reliance Reliance 
8. The degree of supervisory experience you have in audit planning is: 
No Experience A great degree 
of experience 
9. The degree of experience you have in using analytical review procedures is 
No Experience A great degree 
of experience 
10. The degree of experience you have in using statistically-based analytical 
review procedures (e.g., regression analysis) is: 
No Experience A great degree 
of experience 
11. I found the task and materials in this study to be: 
Extremely Extremely 
Uninteresting Interesting 
Demographic Information 
Firm Name:_ 
Number of Years of Auditing Experience: _ Years 
Current Position in Firm: (a) Manager _ (b) Senior _ 
Approximate Time to Complete This Task:_ 
Once again, thank you for your generous cooperation in this research project. 

